

3 Dell Hymes. In Van Dijk et al.

Breakthrough into Performance

The notion of performance is central to the study of folklore as communication. Indeed, it is through the study of performance that folklore can integrate its scientific and humanistic aims in a forward-looking way. On the one hand, the notion focuses attention on social interaction and the kinds of communicative competence that enter into interaction. Here folklore research joins hands with a number of interests and approaches in the social and behavioral sciences. On the other hand, folklore makes a distinctive contribution to the study of communicative events, by focusing attention on the stylized content and conduct within them. Here folklore enhances its concern with the aesthetic and evaluative dimensions of life. One might even hope that folklore would take the lead in showing how appreciation and interpretation of performances as unique events can be united with analysis of the underlying rules and regularities which make performances possible and intelligible; in showing how to overcome the divorce between the emergent and the repeatable, between the actual, the realizable, and the systemically possible that has plagued the study of speech.

Several folklorists have made important use of the notion of performance, e.g., Abrahams, Bauman, Ben-Amos, Dundes, Goldstein, Kirstenblatt-Gimblett, Lomax.¹ The term has come to prominence also in linguistics through the work of Noam Chomsky. The relation between these two approaches is

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¹ Cf. the earlier discussion between active and passive bearers of tradition (von Sydow 1948) and the influential posing of the question "What is meant by performance? And, what are the degrees of performance?" by Jansen (1957:112). I am indebted to Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett for this and several other points.

discussed in another paper (1971), in which I argue that the analysis of verbal performance offers folklore a special opportunity for progress as a field with a distinctive methodology. Here I should like to develop further one implication of the notion itself.²

Some remarks on the relation of performance to behavior are needed as a preliminary. Then I shall present three instances of performance of traditional material by speakers of Wasco, the easternmost variety of Chinookan, now spoken by a few people in Oregon and Washington.³ The three instances illustrate three types of situation that seem important if we are to understand the subtle relation between traditional material and its contemporary use.

Performance and Behavior

In contemporary transformational generative grammar the term performance treats overt behavior as a realization, quite likely imperfect, of an underlying knowledge on the part of a speaker. In contemporary folklore the term performance has reference to the realization of known traditional material, but

²I should like to thank Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, John Gumperz, and William Labov for discussions over the years that have helped shape the perspective of this paper, and Michael Silverstein for a sweeping critique of it.

³The term "Wishram" is retained here, insofar as it identifies the material published by Sapir as *Wishram texts*, and because Mr. Kahlamet accepted this identification in his work with Sapir's student, Dyk, and Sapir himself. In the ethnographic and linguistic literature it would appear that there were two aboriginal communities, Wishram on the Washington side of the Columbia River, Wasco on the Oregon side, and that the Chinookan speakers surviving today on the Yakima Reservation, Washington, and the Warm Springs Reservation, Oregon, are, respectively, Wishram and Wasco. In point of fact, the particular villages from which Wishram and Wasco derive were but two prominent villages among a number of others. At the level of language, the native term *kitsit* embraces the slightly varying forms of speech of all of them. In terms of culture, the communities were essentially the same, and in terms of social structure, closely interconnected through intermarriage, trade, common activities, change of residence, and the like. Many Wasco have Wishram ancestors and conversely. The descendants of the aboriginal eastern Chinookan communities are closely interconnected today through ties of marriage, inherited property, visiting, ceremonial trading, and so forth. On both sides of the river they refer to themselves and their language today in English as Wasco. Clear realization of the extent to which a common community links eastern Chinookan descendants in both states is due to the recent fieldwork of Michael Silverstein. On the aboriginal and historically known culture of these people, see French (1961).

Fieldwork with Wasco was begun in 1951 on a grant from the Phillips Fund of the Library of the American Philosophical Society to Professor Carl Voegelein. Fieldwork in 1954 and 1956 was supported by grants from Indiana University Graduate School (Dean Ralph Cleland) and the Laboratory of Social Relations (Professor Samuel Stouffer). Further support from the Phillips Fund to Michael Silverstein and myself has helped shape the present work. Silverstein has valuable instances of the phenomena discussed here from his work at Yakima reservation, Washington, including a case of code-switching that is telling for the interpretation of a version of the myth of Seal and her daughter (Hymes 1968a, p. 323 in 1971b reprinting); see chap. 8 of this book (p. 298).

the emphasis is on the constitution of a social event, quite likely with emergent properties. In each of the cases to be presented below, these two latter considerations will be essential—the performance as situated in a context, the performance as emergent, as unfolding or arising within that context. The concern is with performance, not as something mechanical or inferior, as in some linguistic discussion, but with performance as something creative, realized, achieved, even transcendent of the ordinary course of events (cf. Jacobs 1959b:7; Hymes 1968).

Within this concern, several distinctions seem to be necessary. Performance is not merely behavior, but neither is it the same as all of culture (or conduct or communication). It ought to be possible to compare communities as to the degree to which performance is a characteristic of life, ranging from those in which it is salient and common, as Abrahams (1972) has shown to be the case in parts of the West Indies, to those in which it is subdued and rare. And it ought to be possible to distinguish performance according to the key in which it occurs; some performances are desultory, or perfunctory, or rote, while others are authoritative, authentic.

If some grammarians have confused matters by lumping what does not interest them under "performance" as a residual category, cultural anthropologists and folklorists have not done much to clarify the situation. We have tended to lump what *does* interest us under "performance," simply as an honorific designation.⁴

⁴There has been little or no fruitful integration of work concerned with the methodology of observational description and work concerned with the methodology of cultural description, culture being conceived as a set of recurring standards or arrangements or both. Some observational work has concentrated on painstaking dissection of components of behavior (kinetics, for example) vital to adequate account of folkloristic performance, but no way of making such analysis part of a normal ethnographic tool kit (as phonetic transcription can be) has been provided. The path breaking and invaluable work on sequential observation, behavior settings, and the like, of Roger Barker and his collaborators (see Barker and Wright, 1954, now happily again in print) has been taken up and elaborated with new ideas by Marvin Harris (1964), but one-sidedly. Whereas Barker and Wright did not take local definitions of behavioral standards, as verbally expressed, into account, Harris excludes them on principle and sets behavioral observation and analysis of verbal behavior in opposition (as "etic" vs. "emic"). A significant new approach to behavioral description, emically conceived, by Maneer Thorpe was refused acceptance as an anthropological dissertation at Harvard and remains unpublished, apparently because its methodological efforts were thought inappropriate. Probably the best and clearest account of cultural description from a standpoint incorporating language (Goodenough, 1970) finds it necessary to separate cultural description from systematic variation that is central to the Sapirian conception of cultural behavior followed here (see n. 6 below), and apparently also from the character of cultural behavior as situated and emergent that is intrinsic to the Chinookan cases below (ibid.: 101-3). Generically speaking, the study of behavior and the study of culture go separate ways, and if "cultural behavior" is spoken and written as a phrase, the integrated conception that it bespeaks is not much realized. The situation is deleterious for study of performance, since, as here conceived, performance is by nature simultaneously cultural and behavioral. On the other hand, study of performance may remedy the situation. Finally, there has been no helpful attention by American anthropologists and folklorists, so far as I am aware, to the issues concerning action and

Recently the linguist William Labov has suggested some interesting, rather operational distinctions that have arisen from his research into naturally occurring verbal conduct, both linguistic and folkloristic (Columbia University seminar on the Use of Language, 1967). Labov has found it useful to distinguish that behavior which persons in a community can interpret (find culturally intelligible) and can report, that which they can interpret but cannot report, and that which they can neither interpret nor report. These distinctions of course imply a fourth behavior: that which persons can report but not interpret (though they may seek an interpretation).

The notion of performance, as developed in this paper, introduces an additional dimension, that which people can do or repeat.

Each of the three dimensions—the *INTERPRETABLE*, the *REPORTABLE*, the *REPEATABLE*—can be regarded as an aspect of the abilities of competent members of a culture or community. Each can also be regarded as an aspect of the circumstances facing the investigator of a culture or community. In either respect, the dimensions would entail the general questions: what behavior is interpretable (cultural?) in this community? for this person? what behavior is reportable in this community? by this person? what behavior is voluntarily doable in this community? by this person? As an aspect of abilities, the questions would lead to a description of the distribution of kinds of competence typical of the community or culture, including the distribution of capacity for performance. As an aspect of investigation, the questions would lead to strategies for discovering the cultural behavior of the community, according as it could be done, or reported, or neither, by whom, where, and when, for whom.

Together the three dimensions imply eight categories of abilities, or circumstances of inquiry. Before illustrating these categories, we must notice that within each of the three dimensions there is a continuum from a minimal to a maximal realization. With regard to the dimension of interpretability in connection with language, for example, Chomskyan transformational grammar postulates and requires of speakers at least a minimal ability to respond to sentences as either interpretable (within the grammatical system under consideration) or not. Speakers may not be usually able to explicate their judgments (Chomsky 1965:21), and such reflections as they may have on interpretability (here, grammatically) are not taken systematically into account. The linguist's grammatical system itself is relied upon to decide difficult cases. The supposed minimal ability itself may not be what it seems, however, for it begins to appear that it involves in important part a rather refined and instructed skill, if it is utilized in isolation from knowledge of other cultural

performance raised in analytic philosophy in recent years. For a useful summary and an original contribution with direct implications for the study of folkloristic performance, see Skinner (1971), especially pp. 4-5 and 15ff., respectively. My own discussion here does not pretend to do more than briefly open up a part of the general subject as it impinges on the process and goal of ethnographic inquiry. Relevant recent articles include Georges (1969), Harang (1972), and papers in Parcels and Bauman (eds.) (1972), and Bauman and Sherzer (1974).

systems. It may be that the more complex judgment of acceptability (subsuming interpretability as a component) must be the true object of investigating.

In any case, the polarity just indicated between *classifying* and *explaining*, on the dimension of *INTERPRETABLE*, can be generalized to all of cultural behavior. The dimension would entail specific questions of the type: "Is this an X?" (say, a proverb, or a myth) (classifying), and of the type, "Why?" or "Why not?" (explaining).

Ability to interpret (in the sense given above), of course, is often connected with ability to report. An answer to the question "Is this an X?" may entail an answer to the question, "Is this an X (for any one, for others) in this community?", or to the question, "Was that an X?" and hence draw on a person's ability to report or describe cultural behavior.

The polarity just indicated between *reporting* and *describing*, on the dimension of *REPORTABILITY*, like the other polarities, manifests considerable underlying complexity. Someone may be unable to report that an act or event has occurred, because to him it was not interpretable; because of the circumstance of not having been present; because in the nature of the phenomenon it is not something he is able to report; because it is not culturally appropriate or permissible for him to report it. The same observations hold, of course, for ability to describe.

If what persons can or will report is less than what they can interpret, what they can or will do is less than what they can report. In a recent class I had thought that a clear instance of something that everyone could interpret (recognize as culturally possible and structured), report (recognize as having occurred), and also do would be to recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag. I was mistaken. Eventually the class settled for recitation of the alphabet. Even here one had to take their word for it, and only after an interval was one older member of the class prepared to offer a recitation. And it was clear that under the circumstances performance would have been accompanied by much evincing of what Erving Goffman has termed "role distance" (1967).

There is thus a polarity between voluntarily *doing* and *performing*, on the dimension of *REPEATABILITY*, taking performing in the sense of truly or seriously performing. There is further the distinction between those ground characteristics of performances that are indeed repeatable, as a musical score or a play is repeatable, and those qualities that emerge in a given interaction or occasion.⁵

Running through the discussion has been a fourth dimension, not hitherto singled out as such, that of the *ACCEPTABLE* or *APPROPRIATE*. In one sense, the dimension has to do with the distinguishing of what persons will do in particular contexts from what they can do in principle. In another sense, the relation between the possible and contextually doable is itself specific to a community, and that which the investigator thinks ought to be doable may,

⁵On the complexity of what may count as repetition, cf. Lord (1960) and Foster (1971).

if inappropriate, be literally not doable for the person in question. The first Chinookan case below may be an example. An instance of a type fairly familiar to linguists is that of a fieldworker among a group in the American Southwest some years ago. His nickname was "Robin". Dutifully eliciting a possessive paradigm for the noun "wing" he was brought up short by his Indian colleague, who refused to give the first person possessive, although both parties knew what it would be if it could be. Suddenly a pleasant thought occurred. "Only a bird could say that, but you can say that, because your name is 'Robin'." And so that summer it was a standing joke that only one person in the pueblo could say "my wing": the anthropologist.

Abstracting from the dimension of ACCEPTABILITY, the range of possibilities implied by the other three dimensions is tentatively illustrated in Table 3-1.

As has been noted, these distinctions may have some value in reflecting on the general problem of assessing behavioral repertoire, and also for alerting students to the small portion of cultural behavior that persons can be expected to report or describe, when asked, and the much smaller portion that an average person can be expected to manifest by doing on demand. (Some social research seems incredibly to assume that what there is to find out can be found out by asking.) Most important for the present purposes is the showing that *performance*, as cultural behavior for which a person assumes responsibility to an audience, is a quite specific, quite special category. *Performance* is not a wastebasket, but a key to much of the difference in the meaning of life as between communities.

It would not be wise to insist on any one set of terms at this stage of our understanding of performance, and the distinctions just drawn are intended only to open up the subject a little further in linguistics and folklore than has been usually done. (The major contribution in general social analysis is that of Goffman [1959, 1963, 1967].) Analytical categories no doubt will change and improve as a broader base of empirical research is given to them. It does seem clear that at one level there can be agreement on the distinctions with which this section began: there is *behavior*, as simply anything and everything that happens; there is *conduct*, behavior under the aegis of social norms, cultural rules, shared principles of interpretability; there is *performance*, when one or more persons assumes responsibility for presentation. And within performance itself, as the doable or repeatable, there is the pole that can be termed performance in full, authentic or authoritative performance, when the standards intrinsic to the tradition in which the performance occurs are accepted and realized.

In each of the cases to be presented, authentic or authoritative performance occurs only at a certain point or in a certain respect. Other parts or aspects of the performance must be considered illustrative, or reportive, or even as oral *scholia*. Each of the cases raises questions as to the difference between knowing tradition and presenting it, between knowing what and

INTERPRETABLE	REPORTABLE	REPEATABLE	
+	+	+	(1) Recitation of the alphabet.
+	+	-	(2) Recitation of Mark Antony's funeral oration from <i>Julius Caesar</i> .
+	-	+	(3) As "report": many skills expected of a linguistic informant, such as paraphrase, phonological contrast, as "describe": tie a shoelace.
+	-	-	(4) Verbally uncoded cultural behavior, such as some maternal behavior according to Bateson's "double-bind" theory of schizophrenia.
-	+	+	(5) As "classify": "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" as a reportable, repeatable, semantically uninterpretable sentence; as "explain": rote use of an uncomprehended religious language, rote recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
-	+	-	(6) Dreams reported to a psychiatrist; visions requiring a specialist; speech in a language recognized but not known.
-	-	+	(7) A reinforceable tic in one's own behavior, elicitable and even conditionable without one's own awareness.
-	-	-	(8) Speech in an unrecognizable language.

Table 3-1. Categories of ability

knowing how, between knowledge, on the one hand, and motivation and identification, on the other, as components of competence in the use of language.⁶ In each case it is in certain respects, not all, that to responsibility

⁶On identification as a notion central to the understanding of speech, see Burke (1950), especially Part I. The discussion is wise, prescient, and confirmed by events in its view of issues of science and politics (e.g., pp. 22, 26-31), and is even more pertinent today to the ethnographic study of speech and verbal art.

for knowledge of tradition the speaker joins willingness to assume the identity of tradition's authentic performer. The difference, I believe, is fundamental to interpretation of cultural materials.

Recognition of the difference serves obviously as a caution or warning, less obviously as an opportunity. As a matter of what could now be called "data quality control" (Naroll 1962), concern for authentic performance has long figured in folkloristic research, although not often in published reports; and often enough the personal, situational, and linguistic factors that govern authentic performance in a tradition have not been explicitly investigated or adequately taken into account. Sometimes scholars have even ignored or tried to dismiss such a palpable factor as whether or not the language of presentation was the language of tradition. Perhaps the most obvious influence on what we know of the traditions of nonliterate groups has been the constraint of dictation, and dictation slow enough to be written down; the effect on sentence length and the internal organization of texts has been increasingly revealed by research with tape recorder (cf. Tedlock 1970, 1972a). Less obvious is the dependence on what the speaker thinks the hearer capable of understanding; Boas (1901:6) remarked that Charles Cuttee's Kathlamet periods became much more complex as their work progressed. But it is not at all my purpose simply to argue that material failing to meet certain criteria must be rejected or relegated to secondary status. Some material indeed must be rejected or restricted in the use made of it, for some purposes, because of such considerations, although if it is all there is of an aspect of tradition, we should and no doubt will make as much of it as possible. My major purpose is to argue for the systematic study of variation in performance. To think of performance constraints in terms of eliminating inadequacies and obtaining ideal conditions is to perpetrate the same error as the linguist who thinks of performance as something that can be ignored when adequate, something to be noted only when it interferes. On such terms, performance is but a means to an end. But especially in an oral tradition performance is a mode of existence and realization that is partly *constitutive* of what the tradition is. The tradition itself exists partly for the sake of performance; performance is itself partly an end. And while there are cases analogous to the *prima donna* who cannot go on if any detail is not right, more often the performers of tradition are masters of adaptation to situation. There is no more an "U/-performance" than there is an "U/-text." Only the systematic study of performances can disclose the true structure.⁷

⁷Cf. William Labov's systematic study of variation in phonology (1966) and the theoretical analysis on which it is based, as stated by Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog (1968). As a precursor, see the theoretical perspective staked out by Sapir (1934, 1938). Both are reprinted in Mandelbaum (1949). The perspective is elaborated in Hymes (1967, 1970).

Three Chinookan Cases

The Chinookan cases presented here permit comparative study of performances only to a limited extent, and only with regard to texts of the two narratives, the speech having no documented parallel. The results are still of some interest, as to the structure of Chinookan narratives, and as to the relation between myth and tale. The types of performance represented by all three cases are, I think, frequent in the world today, and worth being singled out. The simplest and clearest, a case of breakthrough into authoritative performance at a certain point within a single text, is presented first. It could be dubbed a case of simple breakthrough.⁸ The second and third cases each require comparison to another version of the same narrative and consideration of relations between native genres. Both narratives involve, I think, realization as essentially a tale of what was once a myth, the retained mythical function being separated out and bracketed at an initial point. One (the first of the two to be presented) might be dubbed a case of simple metaphorasis; the other, because of the introduction of an additional function, as will be explained, can be dubbed a case of complex metaphorasis, *metaphrasis* being adopted here as a technical term for interpretive transformation of genre.⁹

The Crier—A Morning Address

The text to follow came about in the course of inquiry about the word *i-ya-gi:Xmnil*,¹⁰ literally, 'the one who speaks regularly (repeatedly)', with

⁸The use of the term "breakthrough" here is by analogy to what Paul Friedrich has called "pronominal breakthrough" in his fine study of usage in Russian novels (1966).

⁹Cf. Sklate (1966: 35): "Thus, old world tales about supernatural beings and occurrences change in function during the process of transmission from the immigrant generation to the following generation, if there is such a transmission at all. Among immigrants, such as Berta Arvidson, the stories exist as memories of strong experiences with the unseen powers in the old country. Among persons of a subsequent generation, such as August Nelson, they may persist, but merely as entertaining tales, since the very foundation for such stories, namely the belief in supernatural beings, is missing." (I am indebted for this reference to Barbara Krischenblatt-Gimblett.)

¹⁰Most of the information of this note is now given in the orthographic note at the outset of the volume, but it is preserved here as the first publication of certain of the conventions, for a few additional details, and because the alternative way of putting things may be helpful. In the transcription of Chinookan words, the symbols usual in recent Americanist work are mostly employed, but several conventions have been adopted for ease of typesetting or to preserve certain features of performance. As to vowels: the principal phonemic vowels are /i a u/, "as in Italian," to which must be added /ae/ as in English *had*, used for stylistic emphasis and in color terms and a few other words, and a nonphonemic *schwa*, often carrying primary stress and being sometimes stylistically significant. *Schwa*, written here (E), varies across a wide range, including the two nuclei of *button*. The transcription here is not strictly phonemic, indicating elided grammatical elements within parentheses, on the one hand, and

Philip Kahclamet (d. 1958), who spoke it the night of 25 July 1956 in a booth in the Rainbow Cafe, just across the Deschutes River from the eastern edge of the Warm Springs Reservation, Oregon. Mr. Kahclamet had been raised on the Washington side of the Columbia River, some miles east of The Dalles, Oregon, at the aboriginal site of the Wishram Chinook. He had a thorough knowledge of the language and was conversant with much of the traditional culture. In his youth he had served as interpreter and linguistic informant for Walter Dyk, a student sent out by Edward Sapir, who had himself studied Wishram for a short time in the summer of 1905, as a student of Franz Boas. Mr. Kahclamet had gone to Yale as an informant in Sapir's class for a semester, but he broke with Dyk and returned, having destroyed, it is reported, his copies of what he had written for Dyk. In the 1950s at Warm Springs Reservation, where he had land and was working, he was persuaded to collaborate with David and Katherine French in their studies of traditional Chinookan and Sahaptin culture. (Chinookans from the Oregon side of the Columbia had been brought to Warm Springs, together with Sahaptins from adjacent areas, in the mid-nineteenth century.)

When I worked with Mr. Kahclamet in the summer of 1956, he was forthcoming in matters of lexicon and grammar, but resistant to requests to dictate connected text or to tell narratives in either Wishram or English. It was not that he did not know about narratives (as the last case below shows). I speculated that he still held to a certain faith with traditional conditions of proper performance, despite disappearance of any overt native context for such narration at least a generation earlier; that despite the absence of anyone who could judge his narration in native terms, he carried internally a sense of the critical judgment that an older generation, a reference group now largely dead, would have made. There is some evidence that older Indians deprecated the lesser Indian language competence of their descendants, and that Mr. Kahclamet judged creative adaptation of the language to have ceased when he was young. (Acculturative vocabulary bears this out, ceasing effectively with the technology of the early part of this century.) Certainly he now resisted being put in the role of informant as such, having come to

certain phonetic realizations on the other. Thus, (o) is phonemically /u/, and (e) is phonemically /i/. Doubled vowels, such as (aa), indicate expressive length. Front and back vowels adjacent to velars are frequently (e) and (o), respectively; long (ee) and (oo) are sometimes used expressively; primary stress is usually penultimate, secondary stress is usually the second syllable away. As to consonants: ' marks glottalization; for certain consonants normally represented with other diacritics (supposed "hatcheck," supposed dot, bar) capitalization is used instead. Thus S and C are as in English *ship* and *chip*; L is a voiceless lateral fricative, as in the *ll* and *ß* of Welsh *Llewelyn* and *Floyd*; whereas q is a voiceless velar stop, somewhat as in English *kohladi*, but with great local friction in its release in Sapir's texts, G is the voiced velar stop counterpart, the two velars, q and G, being parallel to the palatal pair, k and g. Whereas x is a palatal voiceless fricative, not quite as far front as that in German *ich*, X is the velar counterpart, somewhat as in German *ach*. The two fricatives are parallel to the stop pairs just discussed.

identify with the role of intermediary and, indeed, linguist. In any case, a booth in the Rainbow Cafe as setting, I as audience, at night after work, were suitable to lexicon and grammar, but not to narration. (Nor did other settings prove more suitable.) There were three exceptions. The first (22 June 1956) was a traditional story, told in English, arising out of ethnobotanical inquiries already under way by David French (the last case below). The last (1 August) was an autobiographical account, also told in English, and corresponding in a way to disclosure of a guardian spirit experience, of the time as a child when he had lost consciousness and breath, and was thought to have died. He recovered and an old woman was able to explain the experience as one of his soul having been turned back at the fork in the road that leads to the afterlife (one road leads beyond, one road leads back to earth and to existence as an evil ghost). After he was twelve, the woman told him that he had been turned back because he had some Sahaptin ancestry; had he been full-blood Chinook, he would have been dead. "I wouldn't be here now. That's the reason I believe in this longhouse religion [the dominant native religious practice on the reservation]; and I'm going to stay with it." And on the night of 25 July 1956 he told me the text that follows.

The Crier (Philip Kahclamet)

In the morning he steps out. He intones his words:

"This is Sunday morning. You people should know—I don't have to come round this morning to tell you—that you people should put on all your trappings; that you will come to church.

"You know that we were put here by the Great Spirit. We have to worship him. I am getting to my old age; some of you will have to take my place when I'm gone.

"When you hear the drum this morning, it's calling you to worship the Great Spirit. That's where all our ancestors went. If you go by the old religion, you will see them when you leave the earth. You know we are going to have to leave our flesh in the ground; only our souls go, and we'll be sure we'll meet our ancestors.

"You people know that we didn't come here ourselves. He who created us is above. He put us here. We have to be where we are today. Me—I'm not telling you this myself. I'm only giving you the revelations which I've learned from somebody else.

"When you hear these drums, go. We are Nadidanwit here; this is our country. These white people came; they brought Christianity. It's not for us. The Christianity was brought here for the white people only. The white people cheated us out of our country. So don't follow them whatever they teach you. Shushugli was a Jew; he was not Nadidanwit and he was not for the Nadidanwit. SuSugli i-yu i-kiXaX. Yaxdau i-pendikast, i-kathlik, 'Presbyc-

rian, 'Methodist,' *kwadaw* i-Sik, k'aya amXawiXa. K'aya t'unwit amduXa."¹¹

There is reason to believe that formal oratory, such as this, was important to Chinookan communities. The title itself names a role. The end of the fifth paragraph ("I'm only giving you the revelations which I've learned from somebody else") reflects a fundamental criterion of formal speech events, that the speech be repeated, in that lay its formality and often certainty. (Thus, to have claimed to speak on one's own authority alone would have deprived what was said of authority.) I have tried to reconstruct a cultural pattern underlying such formal speaking elsewhere (French 1958, Hymes 1966). Very little is known of actual oratory. There are indications in Sapir's *Wishram texts* (1909a:216, 219, 218, 228-29). This mostly English text is the only other instance, and the longest recorded instance, known to me.

The special interest of the speech here is that it begins as a report, in the third person, in English ("In the morning he steps out . . .") and ends as authentic performance, in the first person, in Wishram. This is the only time at which I knew Philip Kahclamet to assume the role of speaker in Wishram. The setting was late at night, after a good deal of beer drinking that night, after a good part of a summer working together. And even so, the switch into authentic performance, into Wishram, was brief: two sentences, at the end of, or ending, the speech.

Code-switching from one language to another is here, I believe, a sign of "breakthrough" into full performance.¹² This case might be said to develop

¹¹ *Sisŭgli* is from the French *Jesus Christ* (Zecū kri [with Z as in *azure*]). As to consonants, the initial voiced fricative, not found in Chinookan, goes to the voiceless fricative that Chinookan does have (Z → S); while the second consonant might have been adapted in parallel fashion (z → S). Chinookan words tend to have consonantal harmony in this regard, either S . . . S, or s . . . s, and S is the normal form. Moreover, French Canadian /s/ may have been a somewhat palatalized (s'), hence closer to Chinookan /s/. The r, not found in Chinookan, goes to the nearest equivalent, l. As to vowels, the third vowels match (i : i), and u is the nearest Chinookan equivalent to the second French vowel (ii). The first French vowel might have been expected to become *ii*, giving *Sisŭgli*, but it has been assimilated to the following vowel, perhaps somehow in connection with the matching of consonants in the two syllables. The word is known in Chinook jargon. *Nadādmnit* is a formal, collective name for Indians as contrasted to other kinds of people and beings. The final two sentences translate: "Jesus Christ is a Jew. That Pentecost, Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, and that Shaker (church), don't concern yourselves with them. Don't believe in them." See now also Kahclamet and Hymes (1977) for this text, and "For Philip" (Hymes 1975b) for a tribute to Kahclamet.

¹² Three possible aspects of such a switch regarding the white interlocuter (myself) would be (1) to express distance, (2) to soften the impact, (3) to express community, sincerely or by way of flattery ("one of us" by virtue of sharing understanding of our language). A fourth possible aspect would be to prevent other people from knowing what was said. With regard to the content of what is said in *kikshi* (Wasco), note that the indictment of white people occurs in English before the switch, and the identification of *Sisŭgli* as a Jew is stated in English before being repeated in *kikshi*. The material in *kikshi* thus begins and ends with repetition of what has been said in English (*Sisŭgli*, exhortation not to believe in Christian denominations), only the intervening specification of denominations, partly quoted English, is novel content. As for other auditors, Mr. Kahclamet and I were in a booth at the end of the row and had been working for

through three stages: *Report*. *Translation*. *Full Performance*. The first line is report, concerning a third person. There follows address, quoted in translation. (English performance of such an address is unattested and unlikely, although Mr. Kahclamet very likely had heard such addresses in Sahapin, a language with which he was familiar.) The last three sentences are full performance, anticipated by the introduction of native terms in the preceding sentence. The dominant speech function is clearly rhetorical in nature, a hortatory focus on the addressee, and a perfect example of enlisting an audience in terms of identification and division (cf. Burke 1950).

The sincerity of the identification with the role of speaker is evidenced by the personal experience, summarized above, which Mr. Kahclamet recounted a week later that summer, directly in English. ("Directly," because in our relationship Wishram was not a medium of communication, but an object of study. I take the breaking into Wishram at the end of the speech to imply not only subjective assumption of the role of the speaker, but also momentary forgetting of the immediate audience.)

The third of Mr. Kahclamet's extended discourses that summer, the traditional story, will be presented later. It is the most complex of the three cases, and can be more readily understood after consideration of a performance in which the realization of a tale-like adventure—only one dimension of Mr. Kahclamet's narrative—is the central concern.

Myth into Tale: "The Story Concerning Coyote"

The performance to be considered here is of one part of the cycle of Coyote stories that constituted the most characteristic, salient feature of the oral literature of Chinookan groups. We have three renderings of the cycle, one collected in 1905 on Yakima reservation (Sapir 1909a), one collected in English a little later at the ancestral home of the Wishram on the Columbia (Curtis 1911), and one obtained by myself in 1954. The "breakthrough" in

some time out of contact with other persons in the café, as we had many times before. Thus there do not appear to be reasons for concealment from others or softening with regard to myself. Expression of social distance, either distancing or intimacy, cannot be ruled out as a component of the significance of the switch. I think that in a way both were involved: distancing from the immediate scene and myself insofar as I was perceived as part of it, intimacy insofar as I was accepted as audience for oratory. The key, however, in my opinion is the evidence that the switch is prepared for and seems literally a switch into *kikshi* for the sake of *kikshi*. As mentioned in the text below, the full use of *kikshi* is preceded and perhaps precipitated by three uses of individual *kikshi* terms in the prior sentence, as mentioned above, the first sentence in *kikshi* is not new in content, but repeats a content already given in English. Moreover, my remembered impression (the scene returns vividly) is that it was when Mr. Kahclamet realized that he was launched into oratory in *kikshi* that he became self-conscious, aware of surroundings, and stopped. In sum, it does appear that the initial impetus to the switch was not distance, near or far, or concealment, but an impulse to full appropriateness.

the present case thus is not signaled by code-switching, as the story is but one in a sequence of native language dictations. The authoritative assumption of responsibility for presentation manifests itself rather in context and in style.

As to context: in mid-summer of 1954 Mr. Hiram Smith was working at a small farm near Sandy, Oregon. In late afternoon and early evening he would work with me on the language. At first he demurred at the suggestion that he narrate full myths, just as he had the previous summer I had been with him (1951). He had then spoken of the skill at narration of his dead father (from whom he had learned traditional stories)¹³ but disclaimed ability to tell them himself, although he took evident pleasure in references to mythological characters in conversation, and when the myth was mentioned in which Coyote transforms two women into stone, he volunteered the location on the Columbia of the particular rocks. After several requests, and then with some seeming reluctance, Mr. Smith did supply two short passages that were missing from the myths collected by Sapir. Both involved mythological characters named but left hanging in *Wishram texts*.¹⁴ In contrast, Mr. Smith related several narratives of late nineteenth-century wars and adventures with relish and assurance. The tales were partly dramatized when Mr. Smith would take both parts of a short dialogue. All the tales were volunteered by him, and enjoyed by his wife and children, who showed no interest in the mythology.

In 1954 I offered to prompt Mr. Smith by getting a copy of *Wishram texts*, as a guarantee of the order in which the stories of the Coyote cycle should go. This seemed to reassure Mr. Smith. I would indicate the stories in turn, and Mr. Smith would narrate without reference to the texts. In the event, Mr. Smith did not rely on *Wishram texts* for order, much less for content. His sequence shares certain fixed reference points at beginning and end with that of Louis Simpson (the narrator of Sapir's *Wishram texts*) and that of the Curtis volume. All agree, for example, on locating the "origin of fish" story near the Pacific and as the first story on Coyote's way up the river. Mr. Smith's sequence, however, goes its own way in between that beginning and the last episodes, for the most part, and consciously so. In *Wishram texts*, for example, the second story on the river is that of "Coyote and the mischievous women"; Mr. Smith told that story sixth in his sequence, and specified the location as "below Hood River" at the time of telling, and at another time as the third episode downriver from below The Dalles. To explain (as the geography of the Columbia is not universally familiar), Mr. Smith, mentally looking back downriver from Wishram and Wasco territory, was locating the story much farther along Coyote's way toward that territory. Again whereas

in *Wishram texts* the third story on the river, "Coyote as medicine man," must be fairly close to the mouth of the river and Coyote's starting point, Mr. Smith was definite in locating the story precisely at "Spearfish" (a later name for the best known village of the Wishram), well toward the journey's end.

Other indications of Mr. Smith's knowledge of a definite line of tradition, and judgment of his knowledge of that line, are that he would not tell two episodes in *Wishram texts* (about Coyote showing people how to make fish-traps and to spear fish), though he could, of course, have given a paraphrase of the *Wishram texts* versions, and even though his own initial list of communities at which Coyote transformed things included the two communities in question (SkaiXalmax, Namnit). On the other hand, as in the summer of 1951, he supplied incidents lacking in *Wishram texts*.

The existence of alternative lines of tradition was already attested in *Wishram texts*, when Sapir recorded two contrasting outcomes for the story of Coyote and the mischievous women (1909a:9, n. 2):

Tom Simpson, brother of Louis, took exception to the transformation in the first version, when this was read to him, and denied its correctness. The transformation to water-birds seems more appropriate than that into rocks, however.

Mr. Smith's version agrees with Tom Simpson, and indeed, Mr. Smith entitled the story, "Pillars of Hercules."¹⁵

In sum, Mr. Smith had knowledge of a definite line of mythological tradition; in his own eyes and the eyes of others, he was an accomplished narrator; but until the intervention of a young ethnographer seeking texts, the knowledge and the skill were disjoint. The stories Mr. Smith spontaneously told, and that family and friends spontaneously enjoyed, were tales, not myths. Myths had not been normally told for at least a generation—in 1967 Mr. Smith and Mr. Urban Bruno could remember from their childhoods the last man they knew to have done so.¹⁶

¹⁵The note is interesting for the history of anthropological theory, as well as for the understanding of Chinookan and analogous traditions. In the 1930s Sapir was to begin a famous article on the need for a radically new understanding of culture in relation to personality by citing his shock as a student in reading the ethnographer Mooney's remark in a report on the Onaha, "Two Crows denies this" (Sapir, "Why cultural anthropology needs the psychiatrist"). (The late Clyde Kluckhohn regularly expected Harvard anthropology students to recognize this remark.) Here was an instance from his own predoctoral fieldwork ("Tom Simpson denies this"), but, apparently he was not prepared to take theoretical advantage of either the real or encountered instance until a generation later.

¹⁶Curtis (1911:106) had already anticipated their disappearance nearly a half-century before: "The old men and women possessing knowledge of the stories have largely passed away, and it is likely that no person alive at this time knows all the myths that were current when the tribe was in its prime"; and Sapir described Louis Simpson as "a fair example of the older type of Wishram Indian, now passing away" (1909:1x).

¹³A collection of Wasco stories taken in dictation from Mr. Smith's father perhaps still exists somewhere. Mr. Smith remembers a woman recording stories from his father, perhaps seventy years ago, and particularly that she did not blush at the sexual parts but kept right on writing. She went, he thinks, somewhere in the Southwest. Efforts to identify the person or to locate the material have been unavailing.

¹⁴See Hymes (1953) on which the account of the 1951 work is based.

In accepting responsibility for a telling of the Coyote cycle in the summer of 1954, Mr. Smith was influenced perhaps by the special closeness of our relationship at that time amidst family troubles and in separation from the Reservation community. He did enjoy the role of authority for knowledge; and once committed, he carried through and told each story well. I felt, however, that he was being careful and conscientious, more than spontaneous, at the outset. The telling seemed to reach a different level of enjoyment and authority, when, more than halfway through his sequence, I remarked that one story was not at all clear in *Wishram texts*. What I said was quite true; it was also said with the thought of putting *Wishram texts* in its place as a not infallible authority. He responded: "Well, we'll have to fix that up."

Mr. Smith proceeded to tell a clear, well-woven story with pleasure. That the story involved an obscene act on Coyote's part, and his subsequent discomfiture despite his best efforts was, I believe, no accident. For it was not Coyote as transformer, so much as Coyote, the personification of an ethos of a hunting and gathering style of life still persistent despite technological transformations, that the Indian community, including Mr. Smith, remembered, retained, and enjoyed. One member of the community, Tom Brown, was famous to Mr. Smith for tall stories involving the characteristic character of Coyote that he himself invented. The transformations of the pre-cultural world into its proper Indian condition are not all gone from Mr. Smith's cycle, but the principal one to remain is the initial one involving the provision of salmon, to wlose fishing he, as some others, remained dedicated. It seems understandable that two episodes found in both Curtis and *Wishram texts*, and missing from Mr. Smith's cycle, involve establishing of a technology now lost at the sites of communities along the river now gone, or that in discharging his responsibility to the myth cycle, Mr. Smith provided a unique "Prologue," in which the mythological import is gathered up and bracketed, as it were, at the outset, before the stories begin. It is just possible that the prologue reflects an aboriginal practice; it is similar in spirit, at least, to the title supplied by Louis Simpson for the cycle (*Wishram texts* 2): "What Coyote did in this land." But Mr. Smith's enumeration does seem to extract and collect what is distributed among individual stories in the Curtis and *Wishram texts* accounts.¹⁷

So much for context, of the telling, and of the particular narrative. To consider the style of the particular narrative, on which much of the understanding of its performance depends, we must consider Mr. Smith's text not only in itself, but also in contrast to the version of the same story given nearly a half-century earlier by Mr. Simpson. Because reference must be made to characteristics of the original texts, both they and their translations are given,

¹⁷In translation, the "Prologue" is: "In his travels Coyote was all over. He used to do everything. He would transform things: these creeks and communities. Here are some of their names. Their names: (followed by a list of seven names)."

first Mr. Simpson's, then Mr. Smith's. The texts and translations are arranged here in ways that will be explained in the comparison that follows them. (See Appendix for discussion of the Simpson text philologically).

Mr. Simpson's text

- (1) AGa kwapt gayuya.
- (2) Gayuya: gayulait.
- (3) AGa kwapt gasixmk naukwatsk Isk u'ya.
- (4) AGa kwapt Isk u'ya gasixtuks.
- (5) AGa kwapt gedau galixox: ewi galixox iak'axixpa,
ewi galixox CK'ES iaq'agstaqba.
- (6) CK'ES gaqiuX.
- (7) Galikim Isk u'ya: "Naq(i) it'uktix
imšgnoX."
- (8) AGa kwapt idwaCa gaCuXabu.
- (9) Naqi iq'eX gaCtoX pu gaqawiq'axit.
- (10) AGa kwapt dak dak gaCiuXix idwaCa.
- (11) AGa kwapt kana'wee San gal.XlqlaXit qngi
mGiXatX Isk u'ya.
- (12) AGa idwaCa mCuXadwaix.
- (13) AGa kwapt dak dak (n)itSiq(i)damidaba idwaCa.
- (14) AGa kwapt Isk u'ya walu gagiuX.
- (15) AGa kwapt niXlu'wait: "AG(a) anXLÉ'ma."
- (16) AGa kwapt galikta idé'xamba.
- (17) AGa kwapt galugakim: "Iak'amlax nigixatX
Isk u'ya: iak'axix niSiXatuks."
- (18) AGa kwapt wit'a galikta Isk u'ya.
- (19) Galixlu'wait: "Yaxiba naSqi
qné'qlat: k'aya quSt aGa
aqnlqlaXida."
- (20) Galikta wit'a dixt itq'we.
- (21) AGa wit'aX uXok'aiawul: "AGa
niSiXatuks Isk u'ya", duXikwLilal
wit'aX idé'xam.
- (22) AGa kwapt niXlu'wait: "QuSt aGa aqnxé'qlat."
- (23) AGa kwapt gayuya.

The English translation below is that of *Wishram texts*, apparently as polished by Sapir (cf. 1909a:xi). In the original volume text and translation are presented on facing pages, and the even-numbered pages of text are numbered by line (p. 31, lines 5-22, and p. 32, line 1, for the *Wishram text*; pp. 31, 33 for the English translation; references to *Wt* 32: 1, for example, are thus

possible). For the sake of comparison between Mr. Simpson's and Mr. Smith's narrations here, both texts and translations are presented as sequences of numbered sentences. The numbering and the indentation identify the principal units of the "surface structure" of the texts, narrative sentences and narrative segments, respectively. The brackets at the left of the translation, and the spacing between groups of sentences so labeled, identify the principal units of the content structure of the texts, tentatively named here narrative actions and episodes. The plan of the presentation emerged during the comparison and analysis of the two narrations, and the criteria for the several analytical units will be explained in connection with the presentation of the comparison, following the texts and translations.

Translation of Mr. Simpson's text

- [ENTRANCE] (1) And then he went on.
[SITS] (2) He went and went, [until] he seated himself.
[SUCKS] (3) And then Coyote looked all around.
(4) And then Coyote sucked himself.
(5) [And then] thus he did: He turned (up) his penis, he turned down his head.
[DISCOVERED] (6) Someone pushed him down.
(7) Coyote said: "You [plural] have not done me good."
[CLOSES UP NEWS] (8) And then he looked up the story.
(9) He did not wish that people should find out about it.
[NEWS ESCAPES] (10) And then someone (or something) made the story become loose
(11) And then everybody found out what Coyote had done to himself.
(12) Thus he had headed the story off.
(13) And then they (had) made the story break out (loose).
[GOES AMONG PEOPLE] (14) And then Coyote became hungry.
(15) And then he thought: "Now I shall eat."
(16) And then he went among the people.
(17) And then they said: "Coyote has acted badly; he has sucked his own penis."
[GOES AMONG PEOPLE] (18) And then Coyote went on again.
(19) He thought: "Yonder I am not known; truly now they shall not find out about me."

- (20) He went on (until he came to) another house.
(21) Now again the people are laughing among themselves: "Now Coyote has sucked his own penis," the people are saying [lit: telling] again to one another.
[CONSEQUENCE] (22) And then he thought: "Truly now I am found out."
(TEXT) (23) And then he went on.

Mr. Smith's text

- (1) Ikda:t wí'a Isk'úlya.
(2) Kwapt aGaláx galaXóX.
(3) Didmúit.
(4) Kwapt gayulait.
(5) IEXét.
(6) Kwapt galiktxúit.
(7) Kwapt gaSixuks.
(8) Kwaís náqi qánsipt, Sāngi iyagáqStaqba galgiut'íwa.
(9) Galgiúlxam: "Ixixia, dan wí'a miúXulap?"
(10) Gasixmík nágwatsk: K'áya San.
(11) K'ma gaCLXáCmaq.
(12) GalXLúxwait: "IdwáCa alKdóXwa."
(13) Kwapt íwi ilyáKSn gaCLOX:
idIXdimáX galóXwa náwit
wímalba, inádx kwádau
gigátka.
(14) K'was galIXóX: Dala'áx idwáCa aloXaXa.
(15) K'ma GanCádx ipGólx gaCiup'-
íwax SáXalba itk'álamat;
CánCat aC(a)éwa gadixi'ágwa
idwáCa.
(16) QaXba (a)yuya, kwáb(a) itGuimxat
náwit aCuXwaCmaGwa
idÉlxam.
(17) Alugagima: "(A)éha Ci"
mSXimlit Isk'úlya
Sixuks?"
(18) QaXba wí'a ayuya, dáukwa wí'a
alXimáGwa.
(19) Kwapt t'Lak gayuya.

The English translation is that of Mr. Smith, a sentence by sentence rendering of the story in his own English idiom. A few additions based on the Wasco text have been made in brackets; a few English additions by Mr. Smith have been enclosed in parentheses.

Translation of Mr. Smith's text

- [ENTRANCE] (1) He [Coyote] was going along again.
 (2) Then the sun was shining hot.
- [SITS] (3) He was tired.
 (4) Then he sat down.
- [SUCKS] (5) He was sitting.
 (6) Then he got a hard on.
 (7) Then he started sucking [lit: he sucked].
 (8) He just got started [lit: Just not extent-of-time] (and) somebody pushed him down on his head.
 (9) They told him: "Hey, what you doing [again]?"
- [CLOSES UP NEWS] (10) He looked [all] around: Nobody.
 (11) [But] he heard them.
 (12) He thought: "They'll make news."
 (13) Then he done his hands like this [extended arm, elbow bent, palm erect and facing outward, moving left and right in a wide sweep]: (Then) it became rim-rock clear to the river from the top of the hill on both sides of the river [lit: straight to the river, on this side and that].
- [NEWS ESCAPES] (14) He got afraid: It might make news.
 (15) [But] already the wind blew the down over the rimrock; already the news got ahead of him.
- [GOES AMONG PEOPLE] (16) Wherever he goes, from house to house, he already hears the people.
 (17) They're saying: "Already you folks know [hear] that the Coyote was sucking off."
- [CONSEQUENCES] (18) Wherever he goes, he hears the same, the same thing again. [lit: Where again he will go, thus he will hear].
 (19) Then he went off and left

Comparison of texts

The criteria that have been used in presenting the texts and translations and that enter into the comparison to follow must now be explained.

Narrative sentences. Although the two texts have been presented line by line as sequences of numbered sentences, the choice of units to number has not been based on a priori syntactic or grammatical grounds. One might conjecture, for example, that there could be said to be as many sentences in the texts as there are independent verbs. From the standpoint of both linguistic and narrative function, such a criterion proves inadequate. On the one hand, some Wasco and Wishram sentences have no overt verbs (e.g., the first and the last two sentences in the original of Mr. Smith's prologue). On the other hand, many evident narrative units contain more than one verb. In (9) and (12) of Mr. Smith's text, for example, one clearly does not wish to treat "They told him" and "He thought" as sentences separate from what follows. In both texts, indeed, there are instances in which "he did," followed by an account of a nonverbal act, is parallel to cases with "they said (told)" and "he thought" ([13] in Mr. Smith's text, [5] in Mr. Simpson's). Repetition and verbal parallelism within an instance of what is said, thought, or graphically done also appear to be rhetorical elaborations within a common unit, not demarcation of a new unit. Cases in Mr. Smith's text are the spatial parallels of "this side and that" (13), "Wherever . . . , there . . . " (16), and the spatial-temporal parallel of "Wherever again . . . , same again . . . " (18). In Mr. Simpson's text there are parallel structures within quotations ("His badness he-did Coyote, his penis he-sucked" [17]), and " . . . [negative] someone . . . -me-about-know," "[negative] . . . someone . . . me-about-know-be caused [= 'find out']" (19). Compare also the sequences of verbs, up to three in number, within what are, on other formal grounds as well as intuitively, part of a single rhetorical sentence in *Wishram texts* (102.2, 102.4, 102.5-6). The criterion would seem to be that change of verb without change of actor does not mark a new sentence, at least not from a narrative (or rhetorical) point of view. (Note that the actor is always pronominally marked in the verb in Chinookan and need not be marked otherwise.) Change of actor does mark a new narrative sentence, with one exception, itself statable by a rule: a verb within an account of something said, thought, experienced, or done, governed by a verb of saying, thinking, seeing, or the like. (See [9, 12, 13, 17] in Mr. Smith's text.)

In general, narrative sentences seem to be determined, or delimitable, by the initial occurrence of a limited number of particles and types of verb. Such delimitation is especially clear in Mr. Simpson's text, which reflects traditional myth narration style in the way in which it appears to be "lined out," as it were, in units defined by the dominant initial particle sequence, *AGa kwapt* (hereinafter, *AK*). Of the 22 sentences of the text, 14 begin with *AK* (1, 3,

4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22), one begins with *AGa wi'aX* (21) (cf. *AKW* in [18]), and one with *A* (12). In keeping with the principle that repetition signals structure, occurrences of *AK* have been invariantly translated "And then," although Sapir's translation renders them variously "Now" (14), "Then" (15), "But" (17).

The remaining narrative sentences in Mr. Simpson's text are determined by certain initial verbs. The first type consists of verbs of going, or, more precisely, of traveling, going on. Traveling on is indeed a fundamental premise of the Coyote cycle, both as to his entrances and exits in individual stories, and as to the linking of stories in a cycle. Mr. Simpson uses the standard Coyote myth verb, *gaɣuɣa* 'he was going' (*ga* 'remote past', *y* 'intransitive male actor', *u* 'direction [away]', *-ya* 'to move') in the first sentence, and uses it with emphatic vowel length to begin the second. The first sentence thus is doubly marked, consisting indeed solely of a double marking (particle, verb of traveling) of segmentation. A secondary verb of this type is the verb theme *k-ta*, 'intransitive fast motion', used initially in (20) (and found within [16] and [18]).

The second type of verb has to do with acts of speech. Patently such is *-kin* 'to say' (7). The reflexive verb theme *-X-Luxwa* 'to think' (to wonder with regard to oneself) (19) can be interpreted as denoting inner speech. In the narratives it is treated in a manner parallel to verbs of speaking, being followed, as in quotation, by what is thought (silently said). In (9) the negated verb construction *teX* . . . *-X*, a common Chinookan type, wherein the specific verbal force is marked in the particle and inflectional apparatus (of tense-aspect and persons principally) is attached to the 'factotum' verb system *-X* which can also be considered an example of this type, even though it would be somewhat artificial in English to place a colon before the conditional particle *pu* and the verb. Cf. (14) in Mr. Smith's text, discussed below.

There remain two cases of sentences delimited by change of actor only (6, 11). Obviously the criteria are overlapping, and, as comment on the first sentence has suggested, cumulation of features capable of marking segmentation may be stylistically significant.

The criteria presented above serve to segment Mr. Simpson's narrative completely and consistently. The two kinds of criteria might be said to be ordered, conjunctive particles first, verbs second. As can be seen, the conjunctives are connectives denoting succession of time or place; the verbs denote change of place (and hence of time) or of actor or communicative act (speech, outer or inner).

The same criteria apply to Mr. Smith's text, but with differences in exemplars and position, and even then, not completely with the same result. The differences are a principal reason for considering Mr. Smith's text as assimilated to the genre of tale.

To consider conjunctive particles first: the *AGa kwapt* of Mr. Simpson's text is paralleled here by simple *Kwapt* (K), but the text does not begin with

K, and whereas *AK* marked more than half the sentences in the other text, K marks less than a third in this. Other initial particles here come into play. One is temporal (*KwaɣS*), but with a force within the situation, more than a marking of succession. (There is really here an adverbial phrase in the initial particle position, "just not extent-of-time.") Mr. Smith twice makes use also of a generic particle of place (*QaXba*), each time in a somewhat different coordinate construction (*QaXba* . . . , *kwaba*, *QaXba wi'a* . . . *daɣwa wi'a* [16, 18]), reinforced to be sure by a verb of traveling. Most distinctive of all, Mr. Smith twice makes use of a particle marking not succession but coordinated contrast, *K'ma* (11, 15). One might think to treat *K'ma* as indicating dependence, and what follows it as part of a preceding sentence. In both cases, however, the preceding sentence is of a type that elsewhere always stands alone, and, bipartite itself, is completed by a second part (which may be taken as a quotation of inner speech?—"nothing" [10], "It might make news" [14]). With (15), one has following *K'ma* a quite complex structure that might itself be candidate for analysis as two sentences. Moreover, as will be seen with regard to narrative segments, the placement of *K'ma* fits into a pattern set by the dominant initial particle of the text, *Kwapt*.

Just as with initial particles, so with initial verbs: Mr. Smith's text contrasts significantly with that of Mr. Simpson. With regard to verbs of traveling, the first sentence begins with one, but not in the remote past tense-aspect (*ga*-) typical of myth, rather in the stative present (-*t*) without apparent initial tense prefix of any kind. In any case, this verb form, used by Mr. Smith initially in other stories of the cycle, has quite a different force. Whereas *ga-y-u-ya* conveys simply the fact of going along, (-*ya*), in the remote past (*ga*-), from here to there (*u*-) *-k-da-t*, characterizes the figure of Coyote himself, as in a state (-*t*) of traveling fast (-*da*), indeed very fast (lengthened *a*), "on" (-*k*-), i.e. overland. Mr. Smith begins his stories with a verb that focuses on Coyote himself, not the mythical period, a verb that indeed abstracts from the mythical period; he makes use of *-ya* where it is dramatically appropriate within his text (16, 18). To be sure, Mr. Simpson uses *-k-ta* within his text (16, 18, 20) with dramatic appropriateness (hunger would make Coyote move quickly); but the converse roles of the two verbs of traveling are representative, I think, of differences between the two texts as wholes.

Mr. Smith makes proportionately more use of verbs of overt or inner speech as initial markers, five times out of nineteen narrative sentences as compared to three out of twenty-one, or more than a fourth compared to a seventh of the time. The climax of the story (12-15) indeed is structured partly by them (12, 14) and in a way that fits into the binary structure of "this, then that" pervading the performance. Two instances of verbs of overt speech (*-lam* [9], *-gin* [17]) and one of inner speech (*X-Luxwa* [12]) correspond to verbs in Mr. Simpson's text. The use of *k'waS* . . . *-X* (14) with the qualifying 'perhaps' parallels the negated statement of desire with conditional of (9) in Mr. Simpson's text. The fifth instance is parallel to the rest in form; "he-

looked-all-around (lit., he caused his two little ones [eyes] to look [?] completely about: no one" (10); and it is quite possibly also to be fitted under the rubric of inner speech. If not, this instance, and perhaps those of fear and desire just discussed, would seem to require extending the criterion to include mental acts generally. But notice that mental states, *wherein the content of the state is not coordinately expressed as well*, as if in inner or indirect speech, do not qualify; and some attested sentences suggest that a verb of inner speech is implicitly understood. Compare the first and second parts of the sentence in *Wt* 64: 6-7: "Afraid she-became-of-them, she thought: 'Now they-have-killed me,'" to (20) in Mr. Simpson's text, and the parallel of (10) and (14), preceding *k'ma* (noted just above with regard to *k'ma*).¹⁸

There is one initial verb involving simply a change of actor (3) in Mr. Smith's text. And there remains one verb that does not fit any general criterion, the verb that comprises the sentence "he sits" or "he was sitting" (5). There is no change of actor, no act of speech or mental act, no particle. There is simply a verb-sentence which a consistent segmentation of the text, both as to sentences and as to higher units, leaves standing in isolation. The two cases are parallel in an interesting way, in that both are followed by *kwapt*, and both, while ending in the present-participial-like suffix -*t*, have preceding the verb stem a *t*- 'proximal' prefix (phonetically *d*- in [3]) which has a sort of immediate perfective force. The two sequences (3-4) and (5-6) could be rendered, "Having become tired, then he sat down," and "Having been sitting, then 'it-stood-up-on-him' (literal rendering)." Both have the sequence, premise + narrative action. Notice, moreover, that *kwapt* may occur as a second position enclitic in unstressed forms (as in conversational *AK*), and that *kwapt* is the obligatory introductory conjunction of all apodosis clauses of hypothesis, e.g., *SmniX* ("If") . . . , *kwapt*. (I owe these observations on *kwapt* to Silverstein.) The present sequences may be an analogue. In any case, if (5) is not marked by myth-like formal traits, within a structure that is lined out, it does have a status in a structure that is repeatedly balanced, both locally (the parallelism of [3]-[4] :: [5]-[6]) and throughout, and seems to me indeed a touch of narrative skill.

Narrative segments. The surface structure of both texts appears to involve organization at a level beyond the sentence. In Mr. Simpson's text, the rule is simply that the occurrence of the particle pair *AK* marks the beginning of a new narrative segment. (1-2) can be seen as elaboration in the introduction of the scene (and indeed in *Wt* 30: 5 Sapir does treat them as all coordinate parts, separated by semi-colons, of a single sentence). (8-9), (10-11), (18-19-20) all clearly involve elaboration of a single point in the narrative, not movement on to a new one. The single exception to the rule

is in (6-7). The text itself, however, is obscured here. Sapir does not in fact translate (6), either he or Mr. Simpson or Sapir's assistant Peter McGuff at the point of translation apparently overlooking the change of actor signalled in the verb of (6), *ga-q-i-ux-X*, 'remote past-someone-him-[directive element]-did', perhaps because of the repetition of the verbal particle *CK'ES* 'to stoop'. The repetition of the particle (if valid—see appendix) is itself a nice touch: 'turn stoop he-did- himself his-head-at; stoop someone-did-to-him'. And the act is clearly required by the story, and expressed in Mr. Smith's text by the verb stem -*t'wa* 'to push, shove'. One would have thus expected (6) to begin with *AK*, as do all other initiations of action by Coyote and by others in response to him (cf. [17, 21]). Whether a slip in the act of telling or recording (and Sapir himself notes the text to be obscure a few sentences later in this part [*Wt* 31, n. 4]), or a parenthetical narrative touch embedded within the mythical recitation style, the one exception leaves the general rule of this and other texts in that style sufficiently clear. Narrative segments are marked at the beginning by a standard particle sequence. As will have been noticed, sentences within a narrative segment are indented in the graphic presentations above.

In Mr. Smith's text the rule is quite the opposite. Narrative segments are mostly marked at the beginning of the last (second), not the first of their constituent sentences. This is invariably so for segments containing *K*: (1-2), (3-4), (5-6), (12-13), (18-19). The apparent exception (7) is trivially not an exception, being the only sentence in its segment, it is, of course, last as well as first. The exception here proves the rule in a strict sense. Just this sentence states the act without which the story would not exist. Whereas Mr. Simpson calls attention to it by elaboration and dramatic demonstration (5 following 4), Mr. Smith does it, following preparation (2-6), by playing off against a structural rule of his text, so as to highlight, or foreground, the sentence. Notice, too, that this and the two other occurrences of *K* remaining (13, 19) together mark the three crucial acts on Coyote's part in response to what precedes each: suck himself, transform in order to conceal the secret, go away when the secret is irretrievably broadcast. The other sentences involve actions on the part of others, or states, conditions, or responses of Coyote. *K* signals Coyote's definitive acts. It is not, as *AK* in Mr. Simpson's text, a marker of every segment, but a way of foregrounding some.

The use of *K'ma* at the beginning of the second narrative sentence in two other segments (10-11, 14-15) can be seen to fit into the pattern established by *K*. Each case presents a contrast: Coyote sees no one but hears them; he fears what may be, but it has already come to pass. Two other apparent segments remain, and these (8-9, 16-17) can also be seen to be parallel. Each describes first a situation of Coyote (just started, going), and an action of others affecting him (is shoved, hears) (8, 16), then states what those others say (9, 17). (Notice that in [9] the words are addressed to him, but in [17] are simply being said.) In each case the second narrative sentence can be seen as cul-

¹⁸Silverstein points out that the really important criterion would be voice modulations. It is usually the case that quoted speech (thought perception) is consistently kept in the right voice.

minating the segment with an explicit saying of its point. These segments thus appear to contain unmarked narrative continuation that is literally "unmarked," i.e., for which there is no connective marker.

In sum, the criteria for narrative segments and the manner of handling them contrast strongly. Whereas Mr. Simpson's narrative is "lined out," by repeated use of initial segment markers, Mr. Smith's narrative really lacks segmentation by initial markers of this sort almost altogether. With the apparent exception of *K* in (2), all occurrences of *K* in Mr. Smith's text can be seen to depend for their organizing force directly on the linguistic value of plain *K* as a connective of logical consistency (or continuity). Mr. Smith's text in fact is organized in relation to three kinds of sequential connection: (a) unmarked, expressed by absence of connective; (b) marked, with continuity, expressed by the connective *K*; (c) marked, with contrast, expressed by the connective *K'ma*. The pattern of initial segmentation slots, filled predominantly by *AK*, is just not present. (Notice that surface observation of the presence of *K* might mislead one in this respect.) The situation becomes clear through recognition of two kinds of pattern, one purely linguistic (the syntactic pattern of the zero, *K*, and *K'ma* connectives), and one narrative (as indicated above and in the following section).

It would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that the difference just described is in and of itself sufficient to demarcate myth performances from performances of tales. In point of fact, Mr. Simpson's narration of a legendary and a personal experience both show the predominant use of *AK* ("A quarrel of the Wishram," *Wt* 200 ff., and "A personal narrative of the Paiute War," *Wt* 204 ff.). Moreover, Silverstein has found that those whom he has asked about the differences between certain texts maintain the clear separation into "myth" (*-qanuCh*) and "tale" (*-qiXikad.X*) but present the two in the same way, i.e., in the *AK* (and *ga-* remote tense prefix) pattern. The distinction appears to be based on content in this regard. (There are, of course, other stylistic criteria, notably the formal endings specific to myths.)

That myths might be told in Mr. Simpson's time without the pervasive *AK* pattern is shown by the last two incidents of the Coyote cycle in Sapir's *Wishram texts* ("Coyote at Lapwai, Idaho," and "Coyote and the Sun," *Wt* 42 ff., and 46 ff., respectively), and by the sharp contrast between Mr. Simpson's abstract of the Raccoon myth, replete with *AK* (*Wt* 153) and the full version (*Wt* 153 ff.). The narratives with infrequent use of *AK* were recorded by Sapir's assistant, Peter McGuff, perhaps from the same woman, AnEwikus, who dictated one subsequent myth (*Wt* 164 ff.), and perhaps one or both of the two historical narratives obtained by McGuff (*Wt* 226 ff., 228 ff.). In any case, all the myth narratives recorded by McGuff agree in an infrequent use of *AK* as an initial segment. Initial segment markers are used, *AK* among them, but without the same predominance as a class as in Mr. Simpson's narratives. In some passages *K* itself takes on a dominant role as initial element (cf. the Raccoon story, *Wt* 162). Here then would appear to be an alternative

manner of myth performance. Is it consistent with tale performance by the same person? Of this we cannot be sure at the moment. It may be possible to determine that AnEwikus, Sophie Klickitat (who narrated the second historical tale, *Wt* 228 ff.), and the unmentioned narrators of the other texts recorded by McGuff are one and the same. In any case, the myth narratives are consistent, but the two historical narratives are strikingly different, so far as *AK* is concerned. It does not appear at all in the one narrative ("A famine at the Cascades," told by "an old woman," *Wt* 226 ff.), and in only one sentence (twice repeated) in the other ("A prophecy of the coming of the Whites," *Wt* 228 ff., cf. 228: 16, 19).

Both of the myth narration styles represented in *Wishram texts* contrast with that of Mr. Smith, whose presentation here has gotten away from reliance on initial segment markers almost altogether. His occasional use of such markers and general style of presentation appear to fall together with that of the two historical narratives just mentioned.

I would conjecture that the presence of initial segment markers, notably *AK*, was a criterion of formal narration; that the degree of use of such markers, notably *AK*, was an indication of the degree of formality; that such formality was a necessary characteristic of formal narration of myth, and for some speakers, of formal narration of legends and tales; that not all speakers (or, not all occasions or contents) required this formality of narration of tales.

In sum, Mr. Smith's text is not in style a formal narration of myth, but one possible manner of performance of tales.

Narrative actions and episodes. Both texts share the same set of essential narrative actions, those indicated by the bracketed labels in the presentation of the translations. The significant differences are in the disposition of attention to each. Associated with these are differences in the overall "shape" of the story and the handling of its close. These differences can best be discussed after the nature of the analysis into actions and episodes is considered and the results for the two texts shown.

Comparison of the two texts would lead almost anyone to identify the same set of narrative actions: Coyote enters; he sits; he sucks himself; he is discovered and pushed down; he closes up the news; the news escapes; he goes among the people and finds them talking about what he has done; he goes away. The overt verbal forms and arrangements in Mr. Simpson's text do not much highlight or signal the junctures and discrete elements of this set. In Mr. Smith's text, however, the narrative develops in such a way as to make the structure of narrative actions manifest in the very form. This is accomplished by the balanced pairing of narrative sentences in relation to the use of *K* and other segment markers. Following the initial entrance and setting of the natural scene with the first *K* (2), (3) and the second *K* (4) give the next action [sits]; (5) and the third and fourth *K* (6, 7) give the next action [sucks]. The next two pairs of narrative sentences (8-11) elaborate Coyote's

being [DISCOVERED], then (12) and the fifth *K* (13) give the action [CLOSES UP NEWS]. The next pair of sentences with *K'ma* (14-15) give the next action [NEWS ESCAPES]; the next pair (16-17) again give the next action [GOES AMONG PEOPLE]; and the final pair (18-19) give the last [CONSEQUENCES (Reprise and Exit)]. The relation between narrative sentences and actions is not mechanical, as this review has shown, but a relation between pairing and *balancing* of sentences and narrative actions is indeed pervasive: "First this, then that," so to speak, for each narrative action. There is elaboration beyond a pair (5-7) for [SUCKS] and (8-11) for [DISCOVERED] but built upon a base of pairing, or, better perhaps, binary relationships.

I take this difference in integration between overt form ("surface structure") and underlying narrative action to be a telling indication of the difference between reciting a remembered myth in formal style on the one hand, and concentrating on "fixing up" a story, on the other.

The pairs that constitute the narrative actions can be seen themselves as paired to form larger units, tentatively labeled here "episodes": [ENTRANCE] + [SITS]; [SUCKS] + [DISCOVERED]; [CLOSES UP NEWS] + [NEWS ESCAPES]; [GOES AMONG PEOPLE] + [CONSEQUENCES]. Indeed, these larger units can readily be taken as instances of the familiar narrative units,

Exposition, Complication, Climax, and Denouement (Brooks and Warren 1949:312). The units are to be found in both texts, naturally, but, as with the narrative actions, more obviously and clearly in the balanced development given by Mr. Smith. Indeed, his performance could serve as a textbook case of these narrative units, if an Amerindian example were wanted.

Overall shape and style. A great deal has already been shown of the overall shape and the style of the two texts, but relative emphasis, or proportion, and certain features of style need to be considered before conclusion of the analysis.

The relative proportions of attention to the several actions and episodes are indicated in Table 3-2 for each text, showing (from left to right) episodes, actions, narrative sentences, and the total number of narrative sentences for each action and episode.

With regard to the outer episodes (Exposition, Denouement), it can be seen that Mr. Simpson is half as long with the opening as Mr. Smith, if absolute numbers of narrative sentences are considered, and even briefer, perhaps, if proportion relative to total number in each text is considered (2/22 : 4/19) or at most 4/21. Conversely, it is Mr. Smith who is comparatively half as long with the closing (4/19, or 4/21) whereas Mr. Simpson extends it (9/22). With regard to the inner episodes (Complication, Climax), again Mr. Smith gives relatively greater attention to the earlier (7/19 [21] : 5/22 in the Complication, or more than a third as against more than a fifth). With the Climax there is less obviously a difference, with somewhat greater extent for

	Mr. Simpson's narrative	
<i>Exposition</i>	[ENTRANCE]	(1)
	[SITS]	(2)
<i>Complication</i>	[SUCKS]	(3, 4, 5)
	[DISCOVERED]	(6, 7)
<i>Climax</i>	[CLOSES UP NEWS]	(8, 9, 12)
	[NEWS ESCAPES]	(10, 13, 11)
<i>Denouement</i>	[GOES AMONG PEOPLE]	(14, 15, 16, 17; 18, 19, 20, 21)
	[CONSEQUENCES]	(22) ([23])
		1 (2) — 9 (10)
	Mr. Smith's narrative	
<i>Exposition</i>	[ENTRANCE]	(1, 2)
	[SITS]	(3, 4)
<i>Complication</i>	[SUCKS]	(5, 6, 7)
	[DISCOVERED]	(8, 9, 10, 11)
<i>Climax</i>	[CLOSES UP NEWS]	(12, 13)
	[NEWS ESCAPES]	(14, 15)
<i>Denouement</i>	[GOES AMONG PEOPLE]	(16, 17)
	[CONSEQUENCES]	(18, 19)
		2 — 4

*In view of the "then" in Mr. Smith's English version of (13), its second part might also be a sentence (the emphasis being parallel to that in [6, 7]), if so, this number would be 3 and the total 5. (15) also might be considered a separate sentence, in which case, the number for news and escape would be 3, and the total 5 or 6.

Table 3-2. Relative proportions in the two texts

Mr. Simpson, counting the sentences as numbered (6/22 : 4/19 or 27 percent : 21 percent), but almost no difference, if Mr. Smith's Climax is counted as having 5 or 6 sentences (6/22 : 5/20, or 6/21, or 27 percent : 25 percent or 28 percent). The difference is lessened by the fact that in Mr. Simpson's text (11) is almost properly part of the next episode (Denouement). (Silverstein considers the summary prefigurement of [5-9] in [4] and of the rest of the myth in [10-11] as in classic form.)

Such quantitative measures are only a rough indication, of course, but do suggest for Mr. Simpson's version a line steadily rising from beginning to end, culminating with the Denouement, so far as relative attention is concerned, or a rising line with successively higher peaks, in the Complication, then the Climax, then the Denouement. For Mr. Smith's version there is suggested a curve that rises and falls, peaking in the central episodes, the Complication and Climax. Such profiles emerge more clearly from consideration of several other indications of emphasis, or foregrounding: the location of repetition of incident; of rhetorical elaboration within a narrative sentence; of elaboration

	Repetition of incident	Elaboration w/in sentence	Elaboration w/in segment	Gesture
<i>Exposition</i>	(1-2)?	(2)	(1-2)	(?)
<i>Complication</i>	(4-5)	(5)	(5-6-7)	(5)
<i>Climax</i>	(8, 12)		(8-9)	(?)
	(10, 13)			
<i>Denouement</i>	(14-15; 16-17)	(17)	(18-19-20)	(?)
	(18-19; 20-21)	(19)		
		(22)		

Table 3-3. Emphases in Mr. Simpson's text

within a segment; of dramatizing gesture. Tables 3-3 and 3-4 will help to compare the two narratives.

Further, notice the location of instances of actually quoted speech. There are six in Mr. Simpson's text, of which all but one occur in the Denouement (15, 17, 19, 21, 22); the one exception occurs in the Complication (7). In Mr. Smith's text there are three instances, one in the Complication (9), one in the Climax (12), and one in the Denouement (17). Further, the two instances of reported inner speech occur one in the Complication (10), one in the Climax (14). Since quoted speech appears to have a special saliency in memory for Chinookan narrators, this *concentration of quoted speech* in the one part of Mr. Simpson's text seems an especially strong indication of the location of the emphasis in his performance, i.e., in the Denouement. Insofar as the occurrence of quoted speech in Mr. Smith's text can be said to be concentrated, it is in the Complication and Climax (especially if one considers the two cases of inner speech). (The significance of quoted speech was suggested by Silverstein. It may be an index of what might be called "density of performance," or the "performance load" of a discourse.)

	Repetition of incident	Elaboration w/in sentence	Elaboration w/in segment	Gesture
<i>Exposition</i>	—	—	(1-2)	
			(3-4)	
<i>Complication</i>	?(4-5)	?(8)	(5-6)	
	?(7-8)		(8-9)	
			(9-10)	
			(10-11)	
<i>Climax</i>	(12, 14)	(13)	(12-13)	(13)
		(15)	(14-15)	
<i>Denouement</i>	(16, 18)	(16)	(16-17)	
		(18)	(18-19)	

Table 3-4. Emphases in Mr. Smith's text

In Mr. Simpson's text, as the chart indicates, there is a rhetorical elaboration within the Exposition (1-2); then all four modes of emphasis, including the likely instance of gestural dramatization, focused on Coyote's act of sucking (5) in the Complication. The Climax is somewhat elaborated by repetition of its two events, the closing up and escape of the story; and the Denouement is elaborated most of all by repetition, with internal elaboration within sentences of segments, of its first event, Coyote's going among the people. The foci of elaboration successively change: Coyote's act in the Complication, the related acts of Coyote and of others in the Climax, the thought of Coyote and the scornful speech of others in the Denouement.

In Mr. Smith's text, there is elaboration in the Climax and Denouement analogous to that of Mr. Simpson, but repetition of incident is not strictly parallel in either case. Rather, the repeated part of an incident (14, 18) is followed by a sentence (15, 19) that advances the story to the conclusion of the episode in question. The Climax and Denouement are indeed quite parallel in this regard. Elaboration within a sentence is concentrated in the same two episodes, being used for the resulting actions in the Climax (13, 15) and for the general state of affairs in the Denouement (16, 18)—in short, not mechanically, but for the meanings central to each episode. Elaboration within segments is found simply as the pairing of sentences throughout the entire text that has already been discussed. The one instance of dramatic gesture, finally, comes in the Climax, depicting not Coyote's obscene act, but his display of power.

Almost every indication, I think, points to a view of Mr. Simpson's text as focused on a moral (in keeping with the pedagogic function of myths [Hymes 1958, 1959, 1966a]), Mr. Smith's as focused on a character in a characteristic situation (in keeping with the nature of the continuing interest in tales). Mr. Simpson provides a somewhat foreshortened "crime" and an elaborated "consequences"; Mr. Smith provides a rounded tale about Coyote. A typical trait of Coyote, his expectations contrary to outcome, is present in both narratives, but woven more into the texture by Mr. Smith. The sucking is not dramatized by Mr. Smith, but is prepared for step by step (2-6), as if to give temporal form to a fact of Coyote's essential nature, that of unconstrained response to the appetite or opportunity of the moment. Coyote is given a chance to use his powers by Mr. Smith in dramatized fashion, not by Mr. Simpson; people speak of Coyote's deed as bad in Mr. Simpson's text (17), not in Mr. Smith's; Mr. Simpson's story effectively ends with Coyote's admission, acceptance of the fact that he is found out, whereas in Mr. Smith's story, confronted with the same situation, Coyote, as in other stories, simply "takes off" (*t'La-k*).

Mr. Simpson's story, in fact, does not strictly end. In *Wishram texts*, and in Sapir's notebook, the story runs on directly into another. The last cited sentence, *AK gayuyu*, is the beginning of that next story, not the end of the one now under discussion, which itself begins, as will have been noticed, with just

the cliff ahead of you and told all the news. All the people heard about you.”

Mr. Simpson's text contains no reference to down or feathers, but all versions of the story known to me are consistent on this point, i.e., the versions by Mr. Smith and Mr. Kahclamet, and others obtained by Michael Silverstein. It can be taken as implicit in Mr. Simpson's text, and indeed, as pronominally expressed (as will be seen below). The situation as to the force that carries off the down (in the versions by Mr. Smith and Mr. Kahclamet) and as to the force that breaks out in Mr. Simpson's version, however, is not as clear.

Silverstein has commented to me on the role of the feathers, or down, in this regard. It is perfectly obvious, he considers, that down should be airborne at a point on the river, where many trees and birds are around. The moral of the story in fact hinges on something so insignificant as some chance wind-borne feathers having caused Coyote's well laid plans (first looking around to see that no one was watching, later surrounding himself with rimrock) to “gang agley.” This is without doubt the moral that Chinookans would put upon the story (if one does something wrong, it will get about). There is a further aspect of the escape of the “news,” however, to be explored. This aspect is indicated by the verb with which Mr. Simpson describes the escape. Recall Sapir's n. 4 (*Wt* 31), quoted above, as to the “story” being torn out and breaking out with sudden force. The verb Mr. Simpson uses ([13] of his text) has as its theme *S*... *-qi-da-ba*. It is a form of the same theme found three stories earlier in the place name *S-q'l-da-l-p-L*. ‘It keeps tearing out’, with reference to a lake connected with the Columbia River by a narrow creek. The verb theme expresses rapid motion (*-da-*) out of an enclosed space (*q'l-/qi*) with respect to the two sides (*S-/s-*) through which the motion occurs. (The second and third laterals in the place name [*l, L*] are continuative elements; *s-* and *q'* in the place name are diminutive vis-à-vis *S-* and *q'*; *qi-* in Mr. Simpson's text is the alternant of the adverbial prefix *q'l-* before an underlying directional/tense quantifier *t-* [expressing ‘from there to here’ in its directional sense].) This verb seems clearly to express, not the wafting of a feather over cliffs, but a bursting through them.

It is not at all apparent that clouds sailing above a spot might break through rimrock below them, and clouds are not otherwise known as an agency in Wasco tradition. Wind, cited by Mr. Smith in his translation, is so known, and is the much more likely agency here. I should like to suggest that “clouds” enter the explanation footnoted by Sapir (*Wt* 31) as a euphemism, and that the down, or feathers, have such an association as well. This suggestion involves the status of *id-waCa* ‘news’, as well, and is intertwined with explanation of the differences between what Sapir wrote in his field notebooks (to which I have access through the courtesy of the late Walter Dyk) and what he printed in *Wishram texts*.

As has been seen, Mr. Simpson's text mentions no explicit agent or agency. Mr. Smith's text, however, does provide a name for what it is that escapes, *i-pCu/Wh* ‘down’, and his English translation names what carries it

abroad, the wind. With the aid of these clues, one can clarify in terms of pronominal reference what seemed so obscure to Sapir that he apparently corrected his own transcription (see end of Appendix). That is, when Sapir rewrote *i* in certain words as [u] for printing, it was not, I think, an error in reading his own writing, but a judgment that the pronominal prefix in question must refer, must be in concord with, the nominal prefix of the word for ‘story’, *id-waCa*. The prefix must then be, not singular, as *i-*, but plural, as *u-* and *id-*. Or so I imagine Sapir to have reasoned. In point of fact, the pronominal reference in Sapir's notebook can be consistently explained, and something added as well to understanding of the symbolism of the story.

Two sets of pronominal reference are of concern, those to the agent of certain actions in the Complication and Climax, and those to the object. (Recall that it is quite acceptable in Chinookan to have an incorporated pronoun in the verb as the only overt nominal reference.) With regard to agents in (7) and (13), it is quite fair to take the plural subject pronouns, *mS k* ‘you’ and *tk-* ‘they’ as in concord with the plural prefix of *it-ka* ‘clouds’ in the critical sentence. In (6) *q*, as has been stressed, must be recognized as indefinite agent. There remains *C* ‘third person (masculine) singular’ in (10), what ‘he’ or ‘it’ (for since most nouns must have a pronominal prefix, such a prefix in the verb may refer to other than ordinarily animate beings) could be responsible for loosening the story? Not the plural ‘clouds’. I suggest the singular ‘wind’, which has the appropriate nominal prefix *i-*, whichever of the two main winds, East or West, may be in question (cf. *Wt* 102 for *i-kXidal* ‘West Wind’, and *i-kaq* ‘East Wind’). Just such is the case for the fourth word in (15) of Mr. Smith's text where *C* is the manifestation of what he then gives in English as ‘the wind’.²⁰

With regard to objects, it is quite fair to take the *-u-* in plural object pronoun, *u-*, in (8), as in concord with the plural prefix of *id-waCa*. But the object pronoun *i-* recorded originally in the verbs of (10), (12), and (13) cannot be in concord with the prefix of *id-waCa*, even though that very word occurs in the same sentence. (There are Chinookan nouns whose plurality is marked by a suffix, so that *i-* could be the prefix, but ‘story’ or ‘news’ is not one of them.) I suggest that the object prefix *i-* must be taken as in concord with the noun supplied by Mr. Smith, *i-pCu/Wh* ‘down’. There is, so to speak, a suppressed concord here. And I suggest that the word for ‘down’ shows it

²⁰The wind is marked in Mr. Smith's Wasco text by the pronominal prefix *C* in the fourth word of (15), parallel to the *C* in (10) of Mr. Simpson's text. Probably the West Wind, blowing east in the direction along the Columbia River Gorge in which Coyote was traveling, and speaking, perhaps, with a touch of coastal Chinookan dialect, is meant. The first word, *ixiaa*, unanalyzable in Wasco-Wishram, can be compared to Shoalwater Chinook *xixiaa*, emphatic form of the pronoun marking ‘nearness to second person, present, visible, masculine’ (Boas 1911:618). Cf. also, an analogous Shoalwater form, expressing derision, *eheliiu* (ibid.: 935). The rest of the greeting, apart from *wit'a* ‘again’, is a common expression, *dan miuXidal*, quite literally ‘what (are) you doing?’

to be no accident, but motivated by euphemism, amusement, or both. Other, probably etymologically related words, having to do with bird body parts, have a vulgar second meaning in Chinookan: *i-pqulX̣i* 'feathers' is attested in the Kathlamet dialect as a euphemism for excrement (Boas 1901: 216, l. 4). Mr. Smith cautioned me early in our relationship to be careful of a brother who would teach me the stem *-p̣i* 'instead of *-piq* for 'wing'; the former is a slang word for a woman's genital organ. While there are words for 'semen' in Wasco, *il̥k̥ Ep̣k̥ Ep̣-maX̣* (related possibly to the word for 'white' and to the word for 'salmon milt' [*-l̥q̣ in̥*]), and *il̥ Cia-maX̣*, I suggest that *ip̣GulX̣* is here their surrogate. In other words, I suggest, given the indications of bird body-part euphemisms and Coyote's Gargantuan nature, that what gets away from him at this point is suggestive of, if not symbolized by, the product of his act.²¹ Hence the involvement of the "clouds" in the explanation reported in Wt 31, note 4, which I take to be another euphemistic reference. Hence also the ability of the people round about (presumably upriver) to interpret the evidence of the "story." Sapir put "story" in quotation marks presumably because he did not think it a real story; so might the Wasco have thought as well. Indeed, the pattern of pronominal forms and implicit concord recorded in Sapir's notebook, and discussed above, in (10), (12), and (13), makes *id̥waCa* appear to function as if in quotation marks, as surrogate for a noun implicitly meant, and signaled by the object pronoun in the verb whose concord cannot be with *id̥waCa*. The sentences appear to read, respectively, as saying to loosen/to head off/to make break loose "news" (i.e., down). And in Mr. Smith's text (15), down and "news" are explicitly equated by parallelism.

Sapir annotated the plural agent prefix of (7) (translated 'You') the following note (Wt 30, n. 3):

[You] That is, the "story" of what he did, which would spread among the people and make Coyote their butt. A curious materialization of a narrative or report into an entity independent of the narrator is here exemplified, similarly to the common conception of a name as a thing existing independently of its bearer.

But what has pushed Coyote's head down is singular, not plural, in formal concord. Coyote's use of the plural may be evidence of his being mistaken as

²¹The interpretation assumes that Coyote, having been surprised, continues his activity, once he has surrounded himself with rimrock. This sequence is, in fact, the one found by Silverstein in the versions of the story he has obtained. On this assumption, perhaps, depends the repetition and partial contrast, as between (12) and (14). In (12) Coyote thinks, they will make news, directly, he being exposed, and responds. In (14) he fears *perhaps* there will come to be news (not: they make [tell] news), presumably the escape of what is immediately mentioned, "But already the down. . . ." The "news" then presumably is spread in and by the wind, an adversary of Coyote in another myth (Wt 99).

to what has happened to him, as he often enough is in such encounters. (Cf. Mr. Kahlanet's version, quoted above.) There would be humor here in Coyote's supposition that the cause of his discomfiture must be plural, a gang, when it is in fact a single piece of down. If the plural prefix is linguistically accurate on Coyote's part, and the word *id̥waCa* (with its plural prefix) is implied, so that Coyote is already anticipating that the down will betray his act, make "news," still he is addressing, not an hypostatized "story," but anthropomorphized feathers. And if the suggestion is accepted that the down is not an arbitrary, but in its whiteness, softness, and smallness, an appropriate means of making known Coyote's act, then there is an additional touch of humor on this interpretation as well. In either case, accurate or inaccurate use of the plural in address on Coyote's part, the quoted statement is intrinsically part of a very humorous situation indeed—Coyote has just been made to choke on his own organ. The point of Coyote's remark is not what the "story" will subsequently do; it is addressed by Coyote in terms of what it has already done. In short, the true interest of the remark is not as an example of materialistic folk belief, but as an aspect of somewhat slapstick, somewhat Pantagruelian folk humor.

Mr. Simpson's text, indeed, has another touch of such humor, invisible to any non-native but the grammarian. In (4) Coyote is said to suck himself with the form *ga-s-i-X̣-tuks* (*ga*- remote past, *s*- dual object [with implicit concord probably to the noun for testicles, which is inherently dual], *i-X̣*- 'he with respect to himself' ['reflexive'], *-tuks* 'to suck'). In (17) and (21) the first prefix and the stem of the verbal theme have the form *Ṣ . . . -tuks*. The difference employs one of the several patterns of diminutive-augmentative sound symbolism in Wishram and Wasco, what is small in (4) is larger in (17) and (21). (Not as large as it might be; cf. Wt 10: 16, 10: 18, 12: 9, 16: 25 for transformations through borrowing and subsequent cutting of Coyote's smaller [normal] *ia-k̥d̥ix* into augmented *ia-gal̥ix* and back.)

Overall shape and style again. The part of the narrative just dealt with is located in its middle, in the second part of the Complication—the discovery—and in the Climax. Here especially the contrast between the two texts in overall shape and style is sharp. As we have seen, Mr. Simpson concentrates attention, so far as specific events are concerned, on the first part of the Complication—Coyote's sucking—and then on the first part of the Denouement—Coyote's going among the people. There is some elaboration by repetition in the Climax, but the repetition (12–13) serves to repeat, rather than to develop, the story, as if further clarification were needed; the sentence preceding the repetition has already anticipated and in a sense given away the point of the coming Denouement; and Coyote's motive for closing up the news (9) is given after the event, rather than as a preparation for the event that would move the story forward. By contrast, Mr. Smith elaborates the second part of the Complication—the discovery—with dramatic depiction, and his Climax is presented in a clear parallel structure that uses Coyote's

motives to build the story. Coyote first thinks someone will make it news, then fears (12, 14). The corresponding consequence is first a dramatized depiction of transformational power (13), not a mere report, and second a corresponding concrete depiction of the outcome contrary to his wishes. And as against the linear march of "And then . . . , And then . . . , notice the heightening here in "But already . . . " (as also in the discovery's "just started").

Mr. Simpson's treatment of this central part of the story is indicated by the absence of *Coyote's proper name*. The action moves forward with *Isk'ilya* as actor in (3, 4, 7) of the Complication, and then again in the elaboration of going among the people (14, 18), but in the Climax he is named only by reference. This "bimodal" distribution of the proper name confirms the other evidence of the twin peaks of Mr. Simpson's attention. And the contrast with Mr. Smith's story, wherein *Isk'ilya* enters by name, but thereafter functions by pronominal prefix, save one case of reference by others (17), is perhaps a further indication of the transformation of myth into tale; in other words, that *Isk'ilya* thereafter does not really function as the myth-age Coyote, but just as an amusing character. (On names, cf. chap. 10.)

The contrast in overall shape of the two stories is further shown by a grammatical point of style. When Mr. Simpson picks up the Denouement, using Coyote's proper name and elaborating his motives in anticipation of an outcome, he does so with successively stated mental states and actions; the story proceeds step by step (and, as noted, leads on into another story). Mr. Smith's Denouement is not only concise, it is *no longer a sequence of narrative action*. The highlighted action of the Complication—especially the discovery—and the Climax is over. The Denouement is presented in the form of balanced generalization, employing not a narrative past tense, but the "future", *a . . . a*. This future, there is reason to believe, is perfective; that is, it is used (in isolation without qualifying particles) of outcomes that are certain. An alternative translation of these passages would be: "Wherever he would go, there (at) the camps straightway he would hear the people. They would say: 'Have you already heard Coyote sucked himself? Wherever again he would go, the same again he would hear. Then he took off (split)!' " Here is further indication of the rounded shape of Mr. Smith's story, focused on depiction of the character and characteristic acts of Coyote.

The shape and style of the two texts are significantly different with regard to another aspect of elaboration not previously mentioned. With regard to adjacent sentences, to what extent is elaboration *preparatory*, or *subsequent*, to an event? There is little preparatory elaboration in Mr. Simpson's text. The two parts of (2) probably are a case within the event [sirs]; 22 (3 : 3) are clearly

²²This interpretation of (2) is supported by the transcription in the field notebook of Sapir, which shows the two verbs going together within a second sentence. Sapir's recording perhaps reflects a fact noted by Silverstein, namely, that either one has three or four repetitions of a continuative verb followed by a closing verb (optionally with *nenit* in motion sequences), or (as is the case here) one has a lengthened vowel with rising intonation, followed by staccato, low-tone monotone finishing verb with stress two syllables from the lengthened vowel.

a case within the event [sucks]. There is none within the [discovery] or either part of the *Climax*. Preparatory elaboration is concentrated within the *Denouement*, specifically within the event [GOES AMONG PEOPLE], where (14-15-16 : 17) and (18-19-20 : 21) are elaborated in precisely this way. There is some elaboration of adjacent sentences that is subsequent to the statement of an event: (5 : 4) is such a case, so also (9 : 8), and the second part of (21) may also be noted. At the level of elaboration by repetition of events themselves, the relation between (12-13) : (8-11) and (8-21) : (14-17) is of this same type. Notice that these forms of elaboration are concentrated, first on the event [sucks], and secondly, and predominantly, on the consequences of the news becoming known. At a broader level, the fact that certain specific points can be seen as *summary* introductions (a point made and stressed by Silverstein)—(4) in relation to (5), (8-10) in relation to (12-13), and (11) in relation to (14-22)—gives the overall structure somewhat the effect of a progression with intersecting loops.

By contrast, Mr. Smith employs preparation for an event throughout his performance. After the [ENTRANCE], preparatory elaboration enters into every event: (2 : 3, 3 : 4), (5 : 6, 6 : 7), (8 : 8), (10 : 10), (10-10 : 11), (12 : 13), (14 : 15), (16 : 17), (18 : 19). At the same time, Mr. Smith's style almost makes a rule of a relation of dependence of a sentence on what has preceded it, so that many narrative sentences face both ways, so to speak (making mechanical categorical analysis difficult, and the well-woven texture of the narration evident). It is striking that cases of subsequent elaboration appear to link sentences *across* events: (5 : 4), (8 : 7), (12 : 10-11)—note the sequence of Coyote's mental acts, see, hear, think), (16 : 15).

All the considerations of structure and style lead to the same conclusions. Mr. Simpson is partly remembering and/or reporting a myth, in which his greatest interest is the obscene act and the moral consequences of it, first anticipated (7) and then fully acknowledged (22) by Coyote. It is these two disjunct parts of the story, each capped by Coyote's self-recognition, that are elaborated and perhaps one can say, best performed. Mr. Smith is primarily interested in the character of Coyote, a character in which interest had persisted in his generation, and his performance does not point a moral, but treats the situation as another entertaining representation of the kind of character Coyote was. The story is rounded, concentrated in the adjacent Complication and Climax; far fuller of depiction as opposed to abstract report of action; and finely balanced and woven together.

As to genre: neither performance could strictly speaking be a performance of a myth, since none of the Chinookan conditions for such a performance were met (Hymes 1966a). Mr. Simpson's performance has a number of stylistic features of myth recitation, such as the recurrent lining out of the AK particles, the use of the remote past tense (*ga-*) pervasively, the use of Coyote's proper name. In these respects Mr. Smith's use of the K particle and, in different manner, introduction of Coyote with *ik'daat*, use only of pronominal reference to Coyote in the body of the story, all contrast. There are a

number of well-realized accounts in Mr. Simpson's texts, but here, one might say, part of the time at least he is remembering and reporting what he knows within the style of a myth, while Mr. Smith is performing securely within one style of tale, that is, of a Coyote story focused on Coyote and divorced from consideration of moral and cultural consequences for those who had lived along the river, and whose now vanished way of life he had once, they had believed, made feasible.

As a type of breakthrough into performance, Mr. Smith's account of "The story concerning Coyote" might be said to involve a relation between two genres within a narrative cycle. The content, or import, of myth is reported, bracketed, and framed at the outset ("Prologue") to allow increasing ease and assumption of authority, as the telling relationship proceeds in time, and as the tales proceed in mythical space up the Columbia toward sites confidently known.

Myth into Tale with Commentary

Philip Kahclamet once himself made a remark that may be taken to signal the difference between performance and report. In response to the question "Who told you the story?", he replied: "My grandmother, my mother's mother. She was the only one who *told* me stories. I didn't just hear it. She told me the story." [Emphasis as spoken.]

This remark came at the end of a discussion in which Mr. Kahclamet related a story to David French and myself, early in the summer (22 June) of the example of oration given above. The story corresponds to one entitled "Coyote's people sing" in *Wishram texts* (94, 96, 98), and that title is adopted here, although Mr. Kahclamet's presentation could better be identified as "Grizzly Bear and Big Lizard," with a sub-plot about "Rattlesnake and Coon," and a prologue about "Coyote's children sing." The story is presented without editing or rearrangement of comments and supplements, because the actual form of the presentation is itself the point of the discussion to follow.²³

"Coyote's people sing"

(1) Once upon a time, somewhere about the Wishram people's land—this happened in mythological times. (2) Coyote's sons sing for the first time [i.e., at a winter spirit dance after a successful guardian spirit experience—DH]. (3) One at a time he turned them down—four of them.

²³ I am indebted to David French for the transcript of the story and discussion (which he conducted), and, indeed, for the story itself. Although I was present, the story came in response to his question about a root (*a'Edi*) mentioned in it. The paragraphing is that of Professor French; I have supplied the numbering of sentences. Comments in brackets are those of Professor French, unless initialed DH; comments in parentheses are those of Mr. Kahclamet.

(4) His daughter sing. (5) Her name was *astwawinLX* [this was written (in Sapir's orthography—DH) by PK; he said the *a*-could be omitted]. (6) So, all right. (7) It was all right with him. (8) He went out and collect the people around. (9) His daughter sing. (10) People came; his daughter sing. (11) And after that different people sing, they sang their songs.

(12) Grizzly Bear went over there. (13) He sang. (14) He growled, he growled at the people's feet that were singing. [PK lowered his head in imitation of the Grizzly Bear.] (15) People mumbled his songs. [PK mumbled a song in imitation.]

(16) He told them, "What's the matter with you people? (17) Help me sing. (18) Sing my song. (19) I'm expecting I'm going to eat human head. (20) I'm going to roll it around in front of me and eat it."

(21) There were two little fellows by the door, standing, singing. (22) One of them stepped out. (23) He said to him, "Hey, you Grizzly Bear. (24) This is my people. (25) You're not going to scare them out like that. (26) Not while I'm here." (27) He said to him, "I'm not afraid of you. (28) Why, I could kill you, make you drizzle your excrement out."

(29) Grizzly Bear turned around and looked at him and said, "Oh! *awi* [younger brother], is that you? (30) I didn't know it was you. (31) Why didn't you tell me long time ago. (32) I'd get out of the way. (33) Who are you?"

(34) "I'm *q'aSnan* (Big Lizard)." (35) He quit; he went in. (36) This Lizard he stepped out and said, "Now folks, I'm going to sing." (37) He sing: "*idama Ciu idaa p'ap'a kwi*" [PK indicated that this was repeated].

(38) People were still afraid of the Grizzly Bear. (39) They mumbled. [PK mumbled.] *hai! hai! haiiii* . . .

(40) (That's when you stopped your song.)

(41) He said, "What's the matter with you people? (42) You still afraid of the Grizzly Bear? (43) I am still here. (44) I am going to kill that Grizzly Bear. (45) I am Lizard, *q'a Snan*, from *wakadaiix*. (46) I am going to kill the Grizzly Bear. (47) You folks going to eat the *p'ap'a kwi*, the paws."

(48) Grizzly Bear was sitting over there like this [PK hunched over].

(49) Lizard the same song. (50) That's over with. (51) He quit.

(52) Another *it'uXial* [brave warrior with supernatural power] sing. (53) (I forgot song.) (54) This was a Rattlesnake. (55) He rattled his tail in front of the people. (56) He scare them.

(57) *hai! hai! haiiii* . . .

(58) What's the matter with you people? (59) You scared of me? (60) I'm not going to hurt you. (61) Some of these days I'm going to shoot *Sawalapin*. (62) (This means the poison is strongest when *walapin* [cheat grass, *Bromus tectorum* L.] dries up—about the month of August.) (63) Some place I'm going to put my fangs into someone and kill someone. [PK indicated the fangs by curving two fingers downward.] (64) People mumbled. [PK mumbled.] (65) Still afraid of him too.

(66) There were two by the door. (67) Big Lizard had jumped out first

and challenged Grizzly Bear. (68) Now another jumped out and said, "You, Rattlesnake, I know you. (69) These are my people. (70) You are not going to scare them like that. (71) Not while I'm here. (72) Your poison no good on me. (73) I can kill you. (74) Even if you bite me with your poison, I can burn it out with fire." (75) This was Raccoon, Coon. (76) He told them, "I am Coon, *q'aldas*."

(77) Rattlesnake, he turn around and look at him. (78) "Ah! awi, I didn't know you was here. (79) You should have told me. (80) I would have got out of your way. (81) I'd have quit." (82) He got out of the way.

(83) The rest of the people sang. (84) These two guys stayed there and watched Grizzly Bear and Rattlesnake. (85) The singing, medicine dance, was disbanded. (86) Everyone went home.

(87) This village was down in the valley. (88) The Lizard lives in the hills, in the rocks. (89) The Grizzly Bear didn't forget this Lizard, what he told him.

(90) Grizzly Bear thought, "I'm going to see this Lizard." (91) He hunt around for him and found him too. (92) The Lizard look around and said, "Here comes this Grizzly Bear."

(93) One day Lizard went out to dig *a'Edi* [an edible root which may exist only in mythology, possibly only in this story] and eating it. (94) He was the only one that dug that.

(95) He looked around. (96) Here come Grizzly Bear. (97) He sure come with his tremendous weight, size too. (98) He said, "Here he comes now."

(99) This happened right by his home, his hole in the rocks. (100) Lizard live in the rocks.)

(101) He got to him, looked. (102) "Hello Lizard."

(103) "Hello."

(104) "What you doing?"

(105) "I'm digging myself *a'Edi*. (106) It's my food. (107) I eat it."

(108) "Oh. (109) Hm." (110) They held conversation, about spring and so on. (111) Finally, he said to him, "What did you say to me? (112) That time Coyote's daughter was singing in that village down below."

(113) "Oh, I guess I forgot. (114) I don't know what I said." (115) (He excuse to him.)

(116) Finally he got close to him. (117) "Gee, you got little arms." [PK imitated Grizzly Bear by feeling DF's arm.] (118) (Grizzly Bear has got big hands.)

(119) "Oh gee, don't squeeze my arms. (120) I need my arms to dig *a'Edi*." (121) So finally he got tired of him and said, "I'll tell you what I told you. (122) I told you, 'You Grizzly Bear, I'm not afraid of you.' (123) I can drive my spear right through your belly, with an arrowhead one side broken off from *wakdaitix* and make you drizzle out excrements."

(124) "O.K. (125) Let's see you do it. (126) Go ahead."

(127) The bear growled. (128) He stood up. (129) Lizard little, Grizzly

Bear big. (130) He got back and jumped on the Lizard and Lizard jumped in his hole in the rocks. (131) Grizzly Bear couldn't find him.

(132) Lizard came out of the hole. (133) He was already painted with grey clay and he had a spear with one point broken off [PK made a drawing of an asymmetrical spear head]. (134) He drove it into him and killed him. (135) Grizzly Bear died. (136) Look at him. (137) Dead. (138) "O.K., he's dead now."

(139) So he come down to the village. (140) "Oh there comes Lizard down. (141) He never comes down here. (142) He never came down here before." (143) They got to the Lizard. (144) "Oh hello Lizard."

(145) "Hello, people."

(146) "Hello."

(147) "Hello. (148) You know what happened last winter—you were scared."

(149) "Yeah, we were scared."

(150) "Well, I come here to tell you people that Grizzly Bear is dead.

(151) I killed that Grizzly Bear dead over there in the hills. (152) I promised you *p'ap'akwn*."

(153) "Oh, oh!" (154) Everybody rejoice. (155) Old people got to Grizzly Bear and got this *p'ap'akwn*. (156) They cooked it and eat it up.

(157) It was all done, the feast was over with. (158) It was done what *i-q'adshnan* told them to. (159) (That's the reason I treat the Big Lizard good.

(160) I don't throw rocks at him. (161) He got good name today among the Wishram people. (162) We'll cut the story off there [presumably as to Grizzly Bear and Big Lizard, since PK proceeds to pick up the thread of Rattlesnake and Coon—DH].)

(163) One day Coon, sitting in his house, got hungry. (164) He said, "I'm going to get myself some *k'astida*" [crayfish]. (165) He went to the creek, searching around in the water, eating *k'astida*.

(166) The Rattlesnake laid out for him in the brush, right in the rosebushes brush, *itC'apamax*. (167) Through the rosebushes he [Coon] felt pain in his foot. (168) He said, "Aduuu! aduuu! aduuu!" [Each in a lower tone than the preceding] (in English that's ouch!). (169) He said, "I got rosebush thorn on my foot." (170) He thought, "Rattlesnake done that to me now."

(171) He was expecting that.

(172) So he made fire. (173) He put his foot, palm, over that fire and burned that poison out.

(174) So he went on up. (175) He got another bit [bite]. (176) "Same damn snake again! (177) Oh, hell!" (178) He burned the poison out again with fire again. (179) He went up. (180) He got several bits like that, about three more maybe [which would make the ceremonial number of five—DH], and then it quit.

(181) That's the end of the whole story. (182) Sometimes we'll put them in.

(183) I cut out the different animal songs. (184) Sometimes we'll put them in.

(185) Lot of different songs like Wolf's: *hánda wi Cai Cai*.

[Q: What did you mean when you said Coyote turned down his sons?]

They were living different places. He sent a messenger to Coyote's house. He told him, "Your sons sing."

Coyote said, "Oh! Which one?"

(I don't know which one but I'll give you this one:) "*Sipa glátsim*." (The name of Coyote's son.)

"Oh", he said, "*'idiq'uyumat*." (Nobody knows what that means now.) "Tell him, '*diXasngwipGá*'" (to quit and go under the house, maybe).

One or two days (I don't know how long) another one sing. *Sipa q'áikwt-gwaX* [the son's name]. He said the same thing, "*'idiq'uyumat diXasngwipGá*." He turn two down now.

[PK said that he hoped to get the names of the other two sons.] [Q: Where is *wakalatix*?]

It's where flint comes from. This Lizard had that flint. He told the Grizzly Bear, "I can spear with *inátka iyaXanq'wit* [-q'wEŋ'wEŋ]. It means: one side broken off. The Lizard told the Grizzly Bear he had this: "I'll kill you."

My grandmother didn't know whether *wakalatix* is a real place or not. [Q: Who told you the story?]

My grandmother, my mother's mother. She was the only one who told me stories. I didn't just hear it. She told me the story.

A'Edi is only mentioned in mythology. My grandmother never saw it. The name of Coyote's daughter, *astwáwinLX*, comes from *wawinLX*, which is the skin on the head of a Chinook salmon. The Wishrams eat that.

General comparison

The nature of Mr. Kahelamnet's handling of the myth can best be brought out in relation to other handlings of it.

Four Wishram-Wasco versions of a myth of a winter sing are available, none as rich as the original must have been in a full-scale performance. Such a performance could have been a cantata-like inventory of all the natural beings with whom the Chinookans shared possession of powers declared in song and maintenance of their world. The fullest in detail as an account of a winter sing is the version told by Louis Simpson (*Wi* 94, 96, 98) and it is on that version that comparison will be focused. The other versions are an account in English in Curtis (124-26), and a brief sketch told me in Wasco by Mr. Smith. For present purposes, we need not go into as much detail as with the preceding case, and the essential points involving comparison to other versions can be made in terms of an

overall outline of the events to be found in any of them. Such an outline requires seven parts:

- (A) Coyote's children sing.
- (B) Various plants sing.
- (C) Grizzly Bear sings and is challenged by Lizard; Rattlesnake sings and is challenged by Coon.
- (D) Various others sing (notably animals?).
- (E) Crow sings and brings the West Wind.
- (F) Grizzly Bear seeks out Lizard; Rattlesnake is encountered by Coon.
- (G) Crow encounters Bald Eagle.

The Clackamas Chinook version told by Mrs. Victoria Howard (Jacobs 1958: 67-75), is mainly an elaboration of (A) that comprises all but the last two pages of the printed text. (B) and (D) are briefly alluded to in part of a sentence: "They [Coyote's children] ceased, then those other people there danced," followed immediately by "All done" (Ibid., 73). The challenge of (C) is reduced to Grizzly Bear swallowing a person, war immediately ensuing. The response of (F) has to do with the Mudfish succeeding in finding, deceiving, and slaying Grizzly Bear. An additional section (H) has to do with Coyote claiming the credit; Mudfish denies his claim and is chased. There is nothing about Crow (C, G). The Clackamas version can nonetheless be entered, together with the others, in a comparative table. Each source is identified by initials: LS Louis Simpson, EC Edward Curtis (his narrator being unnamed); PK Philip Kahelamnet; HS Hiram Smith; VH Victoria Howard.

Mr. Smith's sketch clearly is limited to the occasion of a winter sing, whose outcome is dispersal of the snow when Crow succeeds in bringing the West Wind. He titled it *Ixumit*, which he translated 'Singing ceremony'. His English version of his text is:

A long time ago there was a place where the snow was deep on the ground. Then the chief said, "There'll be a singing ceremony. People will sing.

	LS	EC	PK	HS	VH
A	+	(+)	+	-	+
B	+	(?)	(?)	-	(+)
C	+	+	+	-	(+)
D	+	+	+	+	(+)
E	+	+	(-)	+	-
F	-	+	+	-	(+)
G	+	-	-	-	-
H	-	-	-	-	+

Table 3-5. Comparison of five versions (1)

You'll all come. Maybe somebody might make the Chinook wind come and end the snow and cold weather."

The first one that came forth was the mouse. This is her song: "I make eyes in the root bag." Somebody said, "That person with slanting eyes, get out of the way. Let someone else sing." Then she went back into the crowd. (Then Chipmunk, *i'Ent* [a squirrel], *i'GwáXCul* [greydigger], and, other animals, getting bigger and bigger, and birds. [These are Mr. Smith's words].)

Then the Crow went forth. She sang. She was singing. Then someone said, "The Chinook wind is blowing now!"

They told Watersnake, "Your house might fall down." He ran out. Watersnake wrapped himself right around his house, tight.

Mr. Smith had remembered in isolation Mouse's song, and further inquiry had led to the text translated above. In sum, we seem to have here recall of the central core of a myth, a winter sing to end the winter, a concern expressed elsewhere in Chinookan myths and tales (cf. *Wt* 131), especially in stylized myth endings, as context for individually remembered moments. Both persons and other beings manifested their spiritual powers through songs at the winter singing (and dancing); a general function of myths was to disclose the character of an actor (cf. *Wt* 44: 13). Here inner nature is disclosed, not through narrative action, but through a caption-like song. The story must have offered special opportunity to some performers, and a series among which children listening might remember individual favorites separately. Pedagogically it would give an idea of what a winter dance was like, what spirits a child might expect to encounter, and so forth. The isolated incident involving Watersnake at the end is apparently an example, and probably belongs earlier on in the story.

The Curtis version has the same general setting as Mr. Smith's sketch, a fact signaled in the title, "The animal people hold a medicine-chant." Like Mr. Smith's sketch, the Curtis version specifies all kinds of bird and animal people as having met at a village in winter to sing their medicine-songs. It incorporates, however, the Grizzly Bear—Lizard and Rattlesnake—Coon confrontations—which all versions but Mr. Smith's share—and gives their sequels in a slightly different version from that of Mr. Kahlamet. Probably the Curtis version had also the initial episodes of Coyote and his children. The episodes are not given, but their implicit presence would explain Curtis's note (p. 124, Note 1): "This [the preceding story] and the following story [of concern here] were related as parts of the transformer myth, but they doubtless should be considered as separate stories of a later period." The clear implication is that the framework of the story involves Coyote. As to yet other singers, the Curtis version has almost nothing. After the pair of confrontations, it is said, "Then Black Bear came out to sing, and he was followed by the other animals, and by all the plant people." It had been specifically said that "Grizzly-bear was

the first." The Curtis version thus seems to represent a thread of the tradition, in which the cast of singers begins at the top with the two most dreaded animals (the only two for which the Chinookans had euphemistic respect terms of address) and proceeds down the scale of being through Black Bear to other animals, and then to plants, whereas Mr. Smith begins with the smallest animal (Mouse) and works up (the plants not being mentioned).

After the plant people, the Curtis version proceeds briefly with Crow: "At last it was nearly spring, when Crow started his song. The West Wind began to blow, and the snow to melt, and it was spring when Crow finished." This is used as a step to the sequel to the confrontations: "Lizard went home among the rocks, and one day he sat on the sunny side, making arrows. Grizzly-bear came along. . . ."

In sum, the serious religious and mythological characteristics of the story are reported (or implied, in the case of Coyote's children) but not presented, the attention of the published version being almost entirely on the confrontations and their sequels. One can conjecture that the circumstances were not favorable to performance of the songs, especially since they are spirit-power songs, which people still are reluctant to sing. Curtis did transcribe songs when available, including a *Wisham* one.

Mr. Simpson's text, recorded by Sapir shortly before the Curtis expedition, shares with Mr. Smith's sketch attention to the series of singers. Whereas Mr. Smith uniquely provides a rationale for the sing linked to its outcome (E), an outline of the animal series, and the incidents of Mouse and Watersnake (D), Mr. Simpson uniquely provides a series of plant singers (B), and a concluding encounter between Crow and Bald Eagle (C) (which explains the coloring of each).

Mr. Simpson also uniquely provides details as to the initial event involving Coyote and his children (A), but here so does Mr. Kahlamet. In Mr. Simpson's version, the incident with Coyote's daughter apparently is given completely—a report that grease flows from her mouth while she sings leads him to predict that she will be a medicine-woman; Coyote, here a medicine-man himself, then smokes. (These details all are indications of serious religious activity.) The incidents with the sons become clear against this background, but are not handled fully. Only one son is mentioned, and none is named. Coyote receives a report that blood flows from his mouth while he sings but Coyote only replies, "He is merely lying." Mr. Kahlamet gives a fuller version with respect to the sons, together with an explicit report of Coyote's rejection of them. (Coyote's four sons, who, with the one daughter, complete the sum of his children at the ceremonial number of five, are named elsewhere by Mr. Simpson [*Wt* 66].) In fact, the two versions reflect different threads of the tradition, both as to order (sons—daughter for Mr. Kahlamet, daughter—sons for Mr. Simpson) and as to the verbal exchanges with Coyote. Mr. Kahlamet indeed, after the nominal end of the story,

recalled mythical expressions attested nowhere else. (The contributions of the various versions to a picture of the original tradition show that even fragments may have value, especially when all evidence is partial, and the tradition itself multiform [or, as one might say, extending the metaphor of threads, *filaceous* or *multifilar*].)

The comparison of the several versions may be summed up in letter formulae that better show perhaps the structure of each:

LS	A	B	C	D	E		G
EC	(A)		C	D	E	F	
PK	A	(?)	C	D		F	
HS				D	E		
VK	A	(B)	(C)	(D)		(F)	H

Table 3-6. Comparison of five versions (2)

The most significant difference for our present purpose is in what is missing, as between the versions of Mr. Simpson and Mr. Kahclamet. With Mr. Simpson it is what carries the story beyond the setting of the winter sing. With Mr. Kahclamet it is what gives resolution to the situation on which the winter sing is premised. This contrast fits with other differences in what is presented in each version, and with differences in the way it is presented.

Detailed comparison of the Simpson and Kahclamet versions

Regarding what is presented: Mr. Simpson's details of Coyote and his children (A) give the initial scene a religious character in keeping with a winter sing, a character missing from Mr. Kahclamet's version, apart from the fact of the sing. Mr. Simpson presents a series of plant singers, whereas Mr. Kahclamet simply reports that different people sing (11 in his text). (See further comment on songs below.) Both present the initial encounters between Grizzly Bear and Lizard, Rattlesnake and Raccoon. Both merely report that others sing: they all sing (*Wt* 96: 26, 98: 1), the rest sing (*PK* 83), and neither specifies the animals noted by Mr. Smith and the Curtis version. Whereas at this point, Mr. Simpson introduces Crow and the thought of warm weather, Mr. Kahclamet does not. The contrast is all the sharper, because it is the coming of the wind that leads to the next episode in Mr. Simpson's telling, whereas in Mr. Kahclamet's version, the singing, the medicine dance, simply is disbanded (85-86). Whereas Mr. Simpson now continues on with a further episode involving Crow (G), Mr. Kahclamet continues with the second round, as it were, between Grizzly Bear and Lizard, Rattlesnake and Raccoon, and ends the story without any introduction of Crow.

In sum, Mr. Simpson's version has unity of place within the sing and goes beyond that setting only with regard to a denouement for the actor who is central to success. The confrontations are left resolved within the winter sing setting. In Mr. Kahclamet's version the winter sing is an initial setting, indeed background, for a story whose resolution comes later in two different settings. In Mr. Simpson's version there are salient features associated with the religious character and particular magicoreligious purpose of the sing. In Mr. Kahclamet's version such features are missing or subordinate to an adventure in which a resourceful little guy bests a big bully.

Regarding how the presentation occurs: the nature of the performances, especially Mr. Kahclamet's, can be brought out by considering certain genre features (songs, opening, closing) and two kinds of switching, of code and of style.

Songs. Songs occur in myths as manifestations of identity and particular power. Mr. Simpson gives several songs of plants, and the songs of Grizzly Bear and Rattlesnake, and describes by report the singing of Coyote's daughter and son. Mr. Kahclamet's account of the last does not describe, and the songs presented are entirely within the pair of confrontations. Here he imitates Grizzly Bear's mumbled song (cf. *Wt* 96: n. 1, where the song is said to be in a loud whisper), but also gives Big Lizard's song; Rattlesnake's song had been forgotten (53), but probably would have been given if remembered. (From what is later said of Big Lizard [159-61], I suspect that Mr. Kahclamet remembered this song [nowhere else attested] because of some identification with the figure.) (Note that the songs of plants and animals reflect genuine spirit-powers, while those of Coyote and his children do not; the songs of the latter would be humorous perhaps, but the songs of the former would be the ones valuable to know and convey.)

From the standpoint of the aboriginal culture, the spirit singing and dancing, representing the chief public manifestation of personal religious experience and power, and, like the telling of myths, restricted to the "sacred" season of winter, would have been of major interest. Mr. Simpson makes some effort to supply some of it, and Mr. Smith remembers an incidental song. Mr. Kahclamet remembers some incidental songs, as his epilogue indicates, but in his performance of the story as such, songs enter only to dramatize the confrontation which is the main continuing focus of interest as an adventure. The sequence of songs, which would have been the most distinctive feature of a performance as myth, is missing.

Openings. Traditional myths have characteristic openings and closings (Hymes 1958). Mr. Kahclamet's narrative begins with the English fairy tale opening, "Once upon a time" locates the action explicitly in Wishram territory and states that the events occurred in mythological times. To take up these three traits in reverse order:

(a) Myths do not need to say that they are myths. They begin directly by identifying actors and a situation, either as going along or as at a type of place. Mr. Simpson's text begins: "And thus again they sang in winter"; the Curtis version begins: "All kinds of people met at a village in the winter to sing their medicine songs"; Mr. Smith begins: "A long time ago there was a place where the snow was deep on the ground."

(b) Location is not specified at the outset of a story in terms of a named place. The one exception is Mr. Simpson's version of Coyote at Sk'in, which seems an abstract almost, and a mistake in this respect. Mr. Smith's version, like all other versions of Coyote myths involving a specific known place, identifies the place by name at the end. The only case in which a myth begins with reference to Wishram territory is when it is said that "The five East-Wind brothers were dwelling *far away* in a certain land" (Wt 120: 10).

(c) Behind "once upon a time" might be glimpsed (*G'anGádix* "long ago," with which Mr. Smith's sketch in fact begins. In *Wishram texts* this particle is generally associated with narratives of historical or quasi-historical, legendary character, often cautionary, and with accounts of remembered times before the whites, or even times of one's own youth (Wt 183.4, 183.13, 188.8, 226.6, 228.11). It is so used also by Mr. Smith. The particle begins one quasi-historical legend assimilated to the myth genre by its formal ending ("The deserted boy" [Wt 138: 13]), but the story is otherwise a tale of abandonment and revenge with only anonymous human actors. (Mr. George Forman recently told Silverstein categorically that this story was *giXikad'Xh*, i.e., 'tale,' not myth.) Mr. Smith's setting of a place enveloped in snow has also a quasi-legendary flavor (given legends of just that sort). In sum, either "Once upon a time" is a flat borrowing without analogy in Chinookan myths, or it is a borrowing suggested by a particle associated primarily not with myths but with tales.

Closing. Mr. Kahclamet's narrative does not in fact close. He continues directly with commentary (183 ff.). Partial equivalents to formal closings do occur (162, 181), but both have a metalinguistic element. The first is explicit in reference to the performance situation (rather than the story); not, "Thus the story" (cf. Wt 102: 18), but "We'll cut the story off there" (apparently an inclusive "we"). The second also makes reference to the form of the particular presentation: "That's the end of the *whole* story," and does not truly close it, being followed immediately by an explanation of the contrasting outcomes of the two parts that would not have occurred with a native audience.

The handling of opening and closing is understandable in terms of Mr. Kahclamet's relation to his audience, not Wishram children gathered for the express purpose of hearing myths, and offering gifts to the teller beforehand, but two ethnographers. The omission of songs may reflect the

cessation of guardian spirit experiences, sings and traditional performances of myths, and consequent forgetting, but also quite likely repression of the material, which is both too serious in traditional life and too scorned outside it to be manifested except under conditions of assured confidence of psychic release. Confrontations of the sort between Grizzly Bear and Big Lizard continued to be remembered and occasionally told, through interest in the characters themselves as expressions of a surviving ethos. The names (and songs) of Coyote's sons are something some older person might remember, if asked, Mr. Kahclamet implied. Big Lizard is still someone not to throw stones at.²⁴

Code-switching and style-switching.

The fact that the language of telling is not the language of the tradition, but of interpretation, is in itself a major reason for not considering the performance an authentic performance of a myth. Wishram utterances, however, occur. Sometimes they are associated with interpretive role, as when the name of Coyote's daughter is written out (5), the Wishram name of Big Lizard glossed in English (34), or conversely (45). (See also [47, 60, 76, 164, 166, 168], and the comments afterward on the names and utterances of Coyote's sons and Coyote.) Taken all together, the occurrences of Wishram words are not at all random, but fall into two categories. Some are names of native foods and plants, a fact that seems to me a consequence of Mr. Kahclamet's already established role of collaborator with Professor French in the study of Wishram ethnobotany (which, it will be recalled, led to the telling of the story in the first place). As with the character of the opening, this feature of the performance is shaped by its audience. The other Wishram words all have to do with *identities*, by name or by expression. There are the proper names of Coyote's daughter, Big Lizard, Coon, and Big Lizard's home (*wakalatix*); the names of the role of brave warrior (52) and of younger brother (in interaction, a polite form of address); and there are the expressions of identity in the songs, here that of Big Lizard and, in the epilogue, Wolf. The possible exception within the main narrative is Coon's expression of pain (168), an expression certainly in keeping with and expressive of his character, as not a true hero. A possible exception within the epilogue is in what Coyote says in response to news that his son is singing. Here again, the now untranslatable words, quite likely unique to mythology and this one situation, seem to be expressive of character-

²⁴In point of fact, a woman still living (1971), Dorothy Speed, does know the names and songs, and another (Michael Silverstein, personal communication) has said that she is "scared stiff" of Big Lizard. Cf. the importance of Lizard in the Central Sierra Miwok myths told by Thomas Williams (Gifford 1917). Lizard discovers fire for the people (p. 284), saves Deer's children from Bear (pp. 290-91) in a cognate of the Takeima and Clackamas myths of Grizzly Woman and Black Bear, and is the refuge of Chipmunk's wife when she escapes from the Giants, whom, like Grizzly Woman, he also kills (pp. 300-302).

istic identity. The remaining instance within the epilogue is Big Lizard's description of his broken spear. The fact that Mr. Kahclamet made a drawing of the spear head (133) suggests that it is emblematic of Big Lizard in his role as hero of the story.

These spontaneous incursions of Wishram into a story told in English seem to reflect the public function after which the myth genre was named in Wishram, that of displaying the identity (character, nature) of other than human beings (and of human motives, as isolated and embodied in such beings). As the other type of incursion shows, they are myth elements in what is not itself a myth. Code-switching reflects the genre of origin of the story. Style-switching reflects the situation of its telling.

There is genuine performance in the narration, notably in the handling of dialogue. There is also something not usually found (or at least not usually reported), metalinguistic intervention. A Wishram word is written and an alternative form of it noted (5). A mentioned object is drawn (131). Information that a native audience would already have is supplied (40, 62, 100, probably 115, 118) and, as noted, glosses are given.

Two styles of performance thus are interwoven, that of the narrator and that of the interpreter. The latter reflects Mr. Kahclamet's identification with the role of bilingual collaborator, a role which involves both some distancing, intermittently at least, of the role of narrator (native informant) per se, and some validation of the second strand of the more complex role. In the course of the story there is conversation that is convincingly in native style, but the full performance, the performance for which Mr. Kahclamet would have claimed authority, begins with an explanation of setting and ends with an instance of an ability of which Mr. Kahclamet had become a master, linguistic and ethnographic glossing of words.²⁵

In Mr. Kahclamet's account there is a good deal more information than in the account in *Wishram texts*, as to the confrontations involving Grizzly Bear and Rattlesnake; there is much that clarifies and amplifies both that version and the version in Curtis, although those two versions were recorded almost a half-century earlier. Mr. Kahclamet's version is clearly in the line of tradition represented by the source of the Curtis version, and provides invaluable confirmation as to how the winter sing myth may have served as a complex frame, not only for the depiction of beings through their songs, but also for the linking of individual stories with explanatory import. (The one encounter explains why Grizzly Bear fears a certain kind of lizard, a deadly food causing dysentery [Curtis 1911:26, n. 1], the only creature he fears besides the eagle, which sometimes carries off his cubs; the second encounter explains why [it is believed] a rattlesnake bite does not kill a raccoon [Curtis 1911: 126, n. 2])

²⁵For a valuable analysis of a complex case of metalinguistic intervention, see Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (forthcoming). Such interventions have become a traditional feature of immigrant Yiddish style, so much so that pseudo-glosses may be used in parody.

One can imagine the opportunity provided a skillful performer by such a flexible frame. And in Mr. Kahclamet's account, as noted, there is unique information about uninterpretable words in the dialogue with Coyote. Again, even fragments are valuable for filling out and clarifying the content and form of a tradition that can be seen to have been multifilar, differentially known and enjoyed. Every indication, indeed, is that knowledge of myths and tales, like other cultural knowledge, had a genealogy for each individual. One or a few particular individuals, who told and probably often told certain stories, were crucial here, his mother's mother for Mr. Kahclamet, his father for Mr. Smith.

The tradition, however, was not only multifilar, but also "context-sensitive" (to use a linguistic term), "performance-sensitive," differentially realized according to performer, audience, and setting. Clearly the narratives were not necessarily memorized and recited from memory, but rather, as with Yugoslav epics, the performer worked with a knowledge of the structure of the whole and of appropriate incident and style. There is a straightforward case within *Wishram texts* itself, the relation between the short sketch of the Raccoon story recorded in the field from Louis Simpson by Sapir and the full version later written down and forwarded by Sapir's interpreter, Pete McGuff (*Wi* 153 ff.). And in Mr. Kahclamet's account there is not a genuine performance of a myth. There is grist for the mill of the student of mythical plots and motifs, to whom presence or absence is pertinent, but not necessarily status as to indigenous genre or style of performance. But as has been seen, here features that would define a narrative as a Wishram myth are largely omitted, or simply reported, rather than shown; and to the narrative are added features that stem, not from the role of performer of a narrative, but from the role of collaborator in inquiry, to whom the narrative is also partly an object. Much shows through of the traditional manner of handling a type of encounter, that between a dangerous being and a challenger, but if Mr. Kahclamet's account is not regarded merely as documentation, but is seen for what it is, an event with intrinsic character of its own, then it is clear that what we have is material that stems from a myth, originally associated with the main culture-hero (Coyote) in the role of shaman, and with the principal socio-religious event of the sacred winter season, presented essentially as an adventure tale with commentary.

Conclusion

The three types of "breakthrough into performance" can be summarized in brief formulae.

The morning address proceeds within the text through three stages:

[Report]—[Translation]—[Authoritative performance (oration)].

The "story concerning Coyote" is fully realized in itself, but within the sequence of the Coyote cycle (which was, indeed, considered a single myth as a whole) as given by Mr. Smith, there are two stages, one, as has been said, a bracketed reference to the character of the original genre at the outset, the rest a growing assumption of full performance:

[Report as to genre (myth)]—[Authoritative performance (as tale)].

Mr. Kahclamet's account of the winter sing begins in a manner parallel to Mr. Smith's beginning of the Coyote cycle, but its second stage is complex:

[Report as to genre (myth)]—[Authoritative performance

(tale as story)
(tale as object)]

The central theme of this paper has been the distinction between knowledge what and knowledge how, or, more fully, between assumption of responsibility for knowledge of tradition and assumption of responsibility for performance. Much that has been published, I think, has neglected or confused this difference, treating tradition as something known independent of its existence as something done. Where structure is equated with plot and content categories, such a perspective may suffice, rather, never discover its limitations. Such a perspective, I suggest, tends to falsify traditions, analyzing them solely for the light they may shed on something of interest to us, the history of tales or of peoples, or even the uniform working of the mind of man. All these things are important, but do not include something essential to the peoples who shaped the traditions, the shaping of the performances in which tradition was made manifest, through which it was communicated and made part of human lives. Consider the virtual absence of serious stylistic analysis of native American Indian traditions and of individual performers, of the literary criticism, as it were, that should be a first concern and a principal justification of the study of such traditions. This shows how much we tend to expropriate the traditions as *objets d'art* or as documents for scholarship, how little we have attended to the persons whose traditions they are. In a rare discussion of the character and beliefs of an "informant" (*Wisham texts*, xi-xii), Sapir still apparently felt an apologetic introduction necessary: "A few words in reference to Louis Simpson and Pete McGuff may not be out of place." Presumably the "scientific" audience was interested strictly in the *Wisham* as a collective label and referent. Details as to performer, audience, and setting presumably were accidental. The irony is that a more exact science and method make accidental details essential.

It has been clear, I would hope, that knowledge and performance of tradition are interdependent, in the sense that the nature of the performance

affects what is known, for the persons in a community as well as for the outside inquirer into tradition. Certainly the latter consideration enters into what has been presented here. A particular set of conditions, I believe, made possible the telling of the Coyote cycle by Mr. Smith—previous accepted role as narrator of stories and as knower of features of myths, some dependence for moral support in the immediate situation, some suggestion of an acceptance of me as a surrogate for the children, especially perhaps the son, then uninterested, if not hostile, to what he might authoritatively tell, as his father had told to him. With Mr. Kahclamet there was, of course, the previous experience as informant, a complex and troubled history, so that there was authoritative performance in two roles at once. There was also in the particular summer of 1956 a suggestive order to the three occasions on which he presented material at length. First (22 June) a tale—a cultural object—prompted by ethnobotanical inquiry, in English in his role as collaborator; second (25 July) a speech, presupposing his personal belief, but beginning as an account of impersonal cultural tradition, an explanation of a word; third (1 August) a direct account of personal experience and belief. In a sense, the first was in a third-person role; the second began in third person, moving into second, and breaking into first; the third was first person throughout.

These kinds of considerations affect the validity and very possibility of performances whose audience is an outsider. The persistence of the tradition disclosed in performances, however, was not a matter merely of memory from a remote past. As with the language—which is noticeably slipping away now with so little occasion for use—so with tradition. Continued performance has been a condition of survival. The myths and the features of myths validating the aboriginal life along the river, the ritual telling of myths on winter nights to children after presentation of gifts, geared to a conception of winter as a sacred season, all this has indeed gone except in memory. What has survived for the telling now has largely been material that has continued to be relevant to the ethos of the community, to its moral and psychological concerns: certain characters, notably Coyote, for example, as foci of tall stories, and stories of sexual exploit and discomfiture of pretenders, for men, and sometimes as foci for cautionary stories for women; certain kinds of experiences, tending to warrant the possession, at least by old people in the former days, of distinctively Indian identities and powers; stories of recent days, showing the unprepossessing Indian to have the advantage of apparently superior white man, often in the white man's own terms (money). (There is an uncollected sub-genre of such stories about the purchase of automobiles by Indians with dirty clothes and hard cash.) Some of the performance style has persisted and can be met today in the telling of personal experiences and even new jokes.

These are stories, anecdotes, and the like, that have continued to interest people, for which there has continued to be some audience, and so, some nourishing of performance, some reward for style.

The interplay of Indian and rural white ways of speaking in the English

of the Indians, the form of performance styles in English at the present time, and their likely future, remain to be comprehended. Distinctive ways of speaking, amalgams from a particular period and situation, may persist, despite overlay and undermining by administrative and educational institutions.

It should be clear that analyses of the sort attempted in this study—analyses of the conditions and character of events involving known persons, who accept responsibility not only for knowledge but also for performance—entail a thoroughgoing break with any standpoint which divorces the study of tradition from the incursion of time and the consequences of modern history. Such standpoints condemn the study of tradition to parochial irrelevance and deny those who would help to shape history necessary insights into their situation. By bracketing the traditional, and stopping there, such standpoints conceal the need to breakthrough into performance in our own time. The sort of analysis attempted here suggests in a small way some of the considerations that must enter into a study of tradition and cultural hegemony, a study that can transcend a conception of structure either as simply equivalent to conscious rule or as necessarily unconscious, and that can understand structure as sometimes emergent in action (cf. Banaji 1970). From such a standpoint, the validity of structural analysis radically depends on interpretation of the praxis of those whose structure it is, and on self-awareness of the praxis of those who comprehend that structure (cf. Hymes 1970:308–10). I honor philology, which this essay is in part, but only from such a standpoint can the study of tradition continue to be ethnography as well.

Appendix: "The Story Concerning Coyote"

This text is not identical with that printed in *Wishram texts* but rather a text re-edited from Sapir's field notebook, now in my possession through the kindness of the late Walter Dyk. The general principle of the re-editing has been to take the field transcription recorded in the notebook as a guide if it was susceptible of a coherent interpretation consistent with what else is known of the language, mythology, and culture.

There are two major points at which the text presented here differs from that in *WT*: these involve (5–6) and (9–13). In the notebook, and in the text as given here and in *WT*, there are two occurrences of the particle *Ck'ES* bent over, stooped down. The passage is translated by Sapir as follows: "... thus he did: he turned up his penis, and bent down his head (so that) he stooped down." A literal translation of the text printed by Sapir would be: "... thus he became (made himself): turn he-became (made himself) his-penis-at, turn stoop-down he-became (made himself) his-head-at; stoop-down someone-him-made (actor unspecified)."

There are two difficulties with Sapir's translation and text in this regard. As the literal translation just given shows, Sapir's published translation treats

the second occurrence of the particle *Ck'ES* as an elaboration of the first: he bent down his head (so that) he stooped down. Such elaboration is a common enough pattern, but the text here does not support it. The grammatical structure of the last verb has the stooping down caused by someone other than Coyote. (In the verb *ga-q-i-uX*, *q-* marks indefinite or impersonal actor, while *i-*, referring to Coyote, marks object of action.) Moreover, this rendering of the verb is necessary to the coherence, the narrative sense, of the story at this point. The next sentence (7) has Coyote say, "You have not done me good." Coyote's statement makes sense only in response to having had something done to him.

The second difficulty is that the field notebook shows a position for the first occurrence of the particle that is different from the published text: "*ewi galiXoX iak'elxixpa, ewi galiXoX Ck'ES iaq'!Staqpa. Ck'ES gapiuX*" (adapting the notebook transcription to the orthography used in this paper). A line for transposition running over *galiXoX* and under *Ck'ES* brings the word order to that printed in *WT*. Now, such a particle usually occurs before a verb based on the stem *-X*. Presumably this is why Sapir changed the order in the notebook to that in *WT*. Most likely he marked the transposition at the time of original transcription; I think Sapir wrote in the order that he heard and corrected a moment later on the basis of a quick sense of grammatical pattern (cf. *ewi galiXoX* just preceding and *Ck'ES gapiuX* just following). But the transposition separates the second *ewi* from its verb in *-X*, leaving it without one, and so destroying also the parallelism of *ewi galiXoX*..., *ewi galiXoX*.... This leads me to think that the transposition does not reflect what Mr. Simpson actually said but what Sapir considered that he did or should say.

Given the awkwardness of the first occurrence of the particle, one might be tempted to consider it a mistake altogether. One might conjecture that either Mr. Simpson in speaking, or Sapir in transcribing, inadvertently anticipated the occurrence two words later of *Ck'ES* with *gapiuX*. This conjecture would maintain the integrity of *ewi galiXoX*..., *ewi galiXoX*..., resulting in a balanced and indeed consistent sentence. For notice that there is no need for a particle to mark direction of the head, just as there is no word marking the direction of the penis ("up" being supplied in the translation by Sapir). In both its parts the sentence is consistent with indication of the directions of penis and head by gesture. (Cf. such a dramatization in Mr. Smith's text (13); two narratives recently obtained by Silverstein involve acting out the part.)

It seems likely that both occurrences of the particle were heard. The first transcription of the particle in the notebook shows a final *s*, crossed out, before the symbol for *S*, indicating that the word was indeed heard in its first occurrence. And it seems extremely implausible that the second occurrence could be a mistake. Given the two occurrences as recorded in the notebook, it is possible to take both as intended in the order first given. The first

occurrence of *Ck'ES* would be as a directional adverb (analogous to *SaXal* 'up' and *gigwal* 'down'). (The transposed order cannot be ruled out absolutely: *ee'wi* has partly a deictic force, described once by Philip Kahlamet as that of being a "pronoun" for verbs; one could construe the counterpart of the first *galXoX* as being (or including) the accompanying gesture, verbally expressed, only in the second instance. This interpretation has no attested parallels—a single *ee'wi* is known only with an immediately accompanying -*X* verb, but it has some modicum of plausibility.) Whatever the position of *Ck'ES*, its first occurrence has an expressive point. It is part of a cumulative sequence: Coyote turns (up—with gesture) his penis; he turns down (with gesture and word) his head; he is pushed down.

The point, as shown by the correct translation of *gaqiuX*, is that Coyote, having lowered his head, is pushed down further on his penis, choking himself on it (this is quite explicit in Philip Kahlamet's version). The two occurrences of *Ck'ES* can be taken as a play on the word, the repetition serving to highlight the contrast between Coyote's voluntary lowering of his head and his being forced involuntarily even lower.

The second, and more complex point, has to do with reordering of sentences, omission of words, and reinterpretation of a few monophonemic morphemes in (9–13). Broadly speaking, the nature of the problem can be seen by comparing the order of sentences printed in *Wt* with that in the field notebook (omitting here differences in sentence detail). Using the numbers assigned above, the two orders are:

<i>Wt</i>	<i>Field notebook</i>
(9)	(9)
—	(10)
	(11)
(12)	(12)
(13)	(13)
(11)	
(14)	(14)

Table 3-7. Order of sentences

The details of the notebook recording are as follows: After (9) there is a lined-out false start: *Naqi pu* [velar gamma]-*a*, and a second sentence lined out: *AGa kwapt gaCuXa*. The notebook then proceeds in the order just shown: (9)–(10) (with *dak dak* lined out before *idwaCa*)—(11) (with a brace at the beginning of the first verb, containing *ni-* above the *ga-* tense prefix)—(12)–(13) (with the beginning of a verb form, *nik ix* . . . crossed out preceding the verb form beginning *ikSigiXi* . . .). In three cases the notebook shows pronominal object prefix *i-* within individual words, where the corresponding forms printed in *Wt* (in 10, 12, 13) show *u-*.

As has been seen, the order adopted in the present analysis is that of the original notebook. Two observations are pertinent here. First, regarding initial tense prefixes of verbs: it is interesting to notice the occurrence of the prefix *ni-*. This prefix apparently is used to indicate events whose pastness is relative to the local context, falling between *i-*, which indicates actions just undertaken and not necessarily completed, and *ga-*, which indicates actions completed pastness reaching to the age of the story itself. The fact that (13) (corresponding to the sentence in *Wt* 30:12) has a crossed verb beginning, *nik ix* . . ., suggests that the full verb found in the sentence might begin with *ni*, rather than *i* (hence the parenthetic [*n*] in the text used here). Recall also that (11) (corresponding to the sentence in *Wt* 30:14) had a *ni-* in a brace above the *ga-* that occurs in *Wt*. The *ni-* might fit the use of *ni-* in the next verb in the sentence and support the place of the sentence within the conclusion of the preceding part, that is, as not initiating a new part of the story. The notebooks seem to show Mr. Simpson hesitating in the use of *ni-*, but more or less clearly dividing the sentences of the Climax (8–13) between a first set that have *ga-* and a succeeding set that have *ni-*, or for which *ni-* is considered (11–12). This subordinates the latter part of the Climax and changes these sentences from being merely repetitions to having the status of a reprise (suggested by use of "had" in the translation). Were the first verb in (11) to be taken with *ni-*, of course, the first statement of discovery would be remarkably subordinated, being expressed not as the next action but in retrospect (And then everyone *had* found out . . .). The present allocation—the last three verbs of the climax (11b, 12, 13)—is probably correct.

The second observation is that what Sapir mostly did was to take certain prefixes as being in concord with the plural prefix *id-* of *id-wCa*, hence necessarily as *u-*, and to rearrange the material of the Climax so as to bring repeated content together; the notebook, on the other hand, shows *i-* to have been heard, and shows the original narrative to handle repeated content by iteration, as a form of emphasis. As to the prefixes: *Wt* 30:12 (corresponding to [10] has *galuxwX*, but after *ga-* the notebook shows what is almost certainly *C-i* (Sapir's "c-*i*", clearly not *tg-i-*) and a different suffixal ending, -*ix*. (If forced by context and meaning, the writing might perhaps be stretched to be read as *galuxXix*, but such a form would be difficult to interpret grammatically and has no sense in the context; moreover, the preceding lined-out sequence is clearly *A K gaCuXa*.) *Wt* 30:11 (corresponding to [12]) has *niCu* . . . where one would expect the following *X* to be labialized because of the preceding *u*, but the notebook shows clearly dotted *i* instead of *u*. Finally, *Wt* 30:12 (corresponding to [13]) has *ikSiu* . . ., but again the notebook has dotted *i*. The significance of the original recordings of the pronominal prefixes for the interpretation of the myth is taken up in the *Excursus on agents and agency* (pp. 111 ff.). The interpretation of the order (and form) of sentences and verbs in terms of the field notebook informs the preceding analysis of pattern and style throughout.

A few other crossed forms, apparently false starts, and a grammatical slip are found in the Notebook (I, pp. 21–22). None appear to affect the interpretation.

Postscript

A thoughtful review (Segal 1976) has raised questions about the use of the term "performance" and has suggested another term, "demonstration," for some of what is presented in this chapter. The following letter responds to those questions, elaborating conceptual possibilities, from experience at Warm Springs. In this respect the letter is a later analogue to the opening section of the original chapter. It includes a consideration of Philip Kahclamet's text "The crier" that is amplified in VI. [Letter of 7 January 1977 from Dell Hymes to Dr. Dmitri Segal, Comparative Literature and Slavic, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.]

I have just had a chance to read your review of the book edited by Dan Ben-Amos and Kenneth Goldstein, and of my paper in the volume. I want to thank you for your thoughtful and attentive criticism of my paper. I appreciate it very much. You have given the most careful and useful analysis that something I have written has received in some time.

Your introduction of the distinction between performance and demonstration has validity, I think, and I wish I had thought of it. More precisely, I am sorry I did not think to address the issue you raise which leads to the distinction. You are quite right that the special situation of the relation between a narrator and a scholar must be taken into account. I am afraid that my presentation did not address this issue and so left some aspects of the material insufficiently clear.

It is not in fact the case that the native Wasco culture is long forgotten, and that the informants do not know the tradition connected with the texts; or that the tradition was lost already when Boas recorded texts. At least not in the sense in which I am used to the term "tradition." The picture actually is that the informants had experienced some surviving parts of the tradition and had retained them. In particular, they retained fluent command of the native language. They had considerable memory knowledge of the culture (as extensive inquiry in the course of developing a dictionary of the language showed, inquiry which was not limited to glosses for native words but asked about much more). The real issue for the two men (Kahclamet, Smith) was assumption of the role of performer in the native language. Both were quite comfortable in the role of authority about the native language and culture and quite willing to converse in the native language; neither felt comfortable in assuming the role of performer of the myths. (Mr. Smith

always felt comfortable in performing legends and tales, and I recorded a number from him.)

I do believe that Philip Kahclamet moved into speech in his own person (from "he" to "I" in the first text analyzed). I cannot prove this to someone who doubts it. I had worked with him for some time, was pretty much his only close friend at the time, fitted into a complex personal history of his relationships with anthropologists and linguists. He often demonstrated to me or expatiated to me on the senses and uses of terms, in English. This is the only time he ever shifted into the native language. The quality of the moment is something I have never forgotten. My sense of something special happening is reinforced by what he separately told me that summer about his own religious views.

Perhaps you will want to insist that what happened still should be distinguished from "performance," requiring a native audience for performance. There is a sense in which I became audience for him, but there is also a sense in which for the moment my identity as a researcher was not so much transformed as forgotten. My best sense is that when that was remembered, he stopped.

Whether one considers what happened demonstration or performance, it involved for a moment unique assumption of a role never otherwise assumed by him. It was a "breakthrough" and a "breaking out" in some sense.

Perhaps it would be correct to consider the whole text under the heading you propose "demonstration" (and you are quite right to address analysis of the whole text—I failed to make clear, no doubt, that my sense of "performance" focused on the very last bit as such, not on the whole). It would make sense to me to say that Mr. Kahclamet embarked on a demonstration, and that at the very end, with the shift into the native language, a moment of performance entered as well. (My sense of such a shift as special is reinforced by a number of other experiences, in which shift into the native language is like crossing a boundary of identity or identification.)

Your sense of Kahclamet as oriented toward "demonstration" fits very well the character of the third example in the paper, also from him. Your notion helps clarify what was going on there. One might say that he was willing to take on the role of "performer" at length only inasmuch as he could combine it with, or subsume it under, the role of "demonstrator."

I would agree with your point about tales from myths with regard to the second example, so far as the status of that example is concerned. But I wouldn't want to make a general theory out of it. My experience with materials in Northwest Coast cultures leads me to see the process as one that can go both ways.

With Mr. Smith, I do think that I served the role of audience. Not a normal traditional audience, to be sure. The circumstances of that summer in his personal life were such that our relationship became especially close. There

was to me a clear difference in his attitude toward that story and what had preceded. The series began on a note that might be called "demonstration," although once into a story there was no hesitation. Certainly with this story the relish and flair with which it was told fitted the presence of the same elements in certain other stories about Coyote of a similar "obscene" nature which he also told me. Several times Mr. Smith volunteered the stories he told me, within the general premise that I was interested in stories. He told ones he liked and felt authoritative in telling. He consistently refused to tell in any way stories he did not think he knew accurately. The beginning of the cycle was somewhat in between. He knew it but did not feel authoritative. By the time we got to the story analyzed in my paper, or perhaps also, with particular regard to that story, he had no hesitation, quite the reverse.

Again, you might want to reserve the term "performance," but there is a qualitative distinction, an emergence of a quality, here that needs recognition.

What I say about these stories goes together with the experience I have had, and Michael Silverstein, who has worked independently with speakers of the language, has had. The presence or absence of the tradition, of the sense of immediacy, of being face to face with the native tradition, is not all or nothing, but sort of "now you see it, now you don't!" Certain circumstances, topics, occasions, may bring it forward. It seems to be essential that one knows or is assumed to know the native language. Not that every such moment involves recourse to the native language. But somehow sharing the language can be more a bond than racial/ethnic lineage. There is something of an analogy with the French view that sharing French civilization transcends racial/ethnic origin (Césaire, Senghor as major French writers). More generally, it is a question of how much one knows or is assumed to know. (Knowledge of kinship ties and relationships can be a major factor.)

If one reflects on the total range of ways in which Indian culture is conveyed to others in the modern situation at Warm Springs (and no doubt elsewhere), perhaps four points can be distinguished. Some people have developed patterns of what might be called "presentation." They are gifted and effective in speaking to audiences of whites (school children, whatever), explaining and telling stories, customs, and the like. The degree to which they enter into full performance may be questionable, but some of its features are present (direct quotation, at least bits of dramatization).

Some people still know and admire the historically once-important role of *interpreter*. Here the emphasis is upon full knowledge of the languages on each side. The man who narrated six hours of Coyote cycle to my wife (in Sahaptin), once it was done, showed little interest in explication of the original Sahaptin. (Another person had to be consulted for that.) He did show great interest in the adequacy of the English translation (obtained from the other person), correcting points as a demonstration of his equal knowledge of both. (Some locally famous names are still remembered because of this role.) All this

fits into the status accruing to a person of knowledge, sought out by others for such knowledge. (There may be an element of this in Kahlamet's role in the third example in the paper.)

Some people have become familiar with the role of collaborator with a linguist/anthropologist/folklorist. Perhaps the notion of "demonstration" might fit here. These relationships can become close, intense friendships, creating a close world between the parties that is special to them. It is not the same as presentation or interpretation, because it involves explication, and reflection, emergence of a self-conscious reflection that "interpretation" and "presentation" do not require (one can go between languages without worrying about the analysis of either; one presents to people who cannot ask analytic questions).

A fair number of people are able to perform narrative and the like in English and some in the Indian languages (mostly Sahaptin). But appropriate circumstances for performance in the Indian languages are increasingly rare. Formal occasions do exist (in Sahaptin)—certain rituals, as memorial dinners, etc.). Informal occasions are unscheduled and depend on the circumstances of those present and whatever may stimulate telling. Mr. Smith has always found a tape recorder inhibiting (but not a pencil and notebook) if the material were like that in the story analyzed in the paper, so also the presence of a woman. But he will hold forth about his grandmother's powers as a shaman without such inhibitions, if he trusts the sympathy of those present. Some kinds of performance are commonly public—what one might call "boasting." It has a short three-part structure that I find now also in myths and tales, and I have heard Mr. Smith do it in the midst of relative strangers.

I will have to reflect more on these distinctions, get my wife to do so as well, and have them in mind when we are back at Warm Springs this March for a week, and this summer. (We go back every summer now.) Perhaps they will need further revision. But I am grateful to you for forcing me to think these things out further.

In the fall I wrote a paper for the journal *New Literary History*, which has more to say about Wasco performance and tradition than I knew when I wrote the article in the book you reviewed. A good part of it is also in the article "Louis Simpson's 'The deserted boy,'" in the issue of *Poetics* that Dan Ben-Amos arranged [see chap. 4]. The Louis Simpson text was told only to Edward Sapir, so in that respect would be under the heading of "demonstration" in the terms of your review. But I hope that it may seem to you convincing as evidence that performance can occur in such a condition. Of course Simpson was thoroughly rooted in the traditional culture before it had been too much affected by white contact, and lived at a time when there were still true native audiences for myth as well.